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Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing 
BJ Ard* 
Copyright owners claim the power to designate practically any term of a 
copyright license as a “condition” enforceable in copyright.  In doing so, 
these licensors purport to translate breach of the most trivial or idiosyncratic 
term into the basis for a copyright infringement suit.  This Article argues that 
these licenses are most problematic when licensors provide inadequate notice 
of unexpected terms.  License conditions are typically buried in boilerplate 
that no reasonable consumer reads, and licensors have few incentives to 
make them more salient.  These circumstances not only threaten unwitting 
users with copyright liability, but also impede copyright’s own goals by cast-
ing doubt on the legitimacy of the copyright regime and discouraging the 
public’s engagement with creative works.  Copyright law nonetheless offers 
courts no effective tools to inquire into the adequacy of notice. 
Because these agreements arise at a unique intersection of copyright 
and contract, however, contract law supplies a normative and doctrinal 
framework that allows courts to demand more effective notice.  Contract law 
is skeptical of supracompensatory remedies – like those that would follow 
from enforcement of a license condition – and awards them only where un-
derstanding and assent are clear.  Courts therefore ought to require a height-
ened standard of notice as a prerequisite to the enforcement of license terms 
in copyright.  This approach would check against licensors’ overreaching.  At 
the same time, it would leave room for parties to experiment with unusual but 
potentially beneficial licensing arrangements like those championed by the 
free culture and free software movements.  By bringing novel licensing ar-
rangements to light, moreover, this approach subjects licenses to public scru-
tiny and to discipline through market and political forces. 
 
* Ph.D. Candidate in Law, Yale University; Resident Fellow, Information Society 
Project at Yale Law School.  I thank Ian Ayres, Jack Balkin, Maureen Brady, Kiel 
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Christine Jolls, Margot Kaminski, Amy Kapczynski, Michael Kenneally, Christina 
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back on this Article, along with the participants at the 2014 Works-in-Progress Intel-
lectual Property Colloquium, the 2014 IP Scholars Roundtable at Drake Law School, 
the Cyberscholars Working Group, and the Yale ISP Fellows Workshop.  All errors 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright owners now claim the power to designate practically any 
term in a copyright license as a “condition” enforceable on pain of a copy-
right infringement suit.  If they are correct, then they can effectively supple-
ment the six statutory grounds for infringement enumerated at Section 106 of 
the Copyright Act with protections of their own choosing.1  This move in-
creases copyright owners’ enforcement power significantly: rather than simp-
ly sue those who violated the license for breach of contract, they could sue for 
infringement and claim copyright’s statutory damages, easier access to in-
junctive relief, and a host of other litigation advantages.2  Even the most trivi-
al or idiosyncratic breach under this regime would yield mandatory statutory 
damages starting at $750.3 
The power to define one’s own conditions might sometimes be put to 
socially beneficial uses.  Free culture and free software advocates, for exam-
ple, rely on the enforceability of conditions to make their attribution and 
share-alike terms effective.4  It is nonetheless easy to imagine how copyright 
owners might abuse this power by extending copyright enforcement to arbi-
trary and unexpected terms.  These concerns came to a head in MDY Indus-
tries, L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., where a videogame developer 
sued in copyright to enforce license terms that prohibited cheating.5  To avert 
an outcome that would pave the way to enforcement of practically any license 
term in contract, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim and held that, to be val-
id, a condition must bear some “nexus” to the “exclusive rights of copy-
right.”6  Commentators have roundly criticized this opinion for its questiona-
ble adherence to the Ninth Circuit’s own copyright doctrine and for the com-
plications it raises for novel but socially beneficial licenses like those cham-
 
 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 2. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 3. Copyright carries statutory damages from a mandatory minimum of $750 up 
to $30,000, irrespective of actual damages.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012); see Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in 
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (“Awards of statutory 
damages are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly 
excessive.”).  A finding of willful infringement increases the cap to $150,000.  
§ 504(c)(2).  While a finding of innocent infringement would authorize damages as 
low as $200, id., this defense would likely be unavailable in cases of license breach.  
See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
 4. Indeed, when the Federal Circuit recognized an attribution term as a copy-
right-enforceable condition in Jacobsen v. Katzer, it opined that “these types of li-
cense restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce 
through injunctive relief.”  535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (2008).  Novel licensing arrange-
ments like these have the potential to benefit authors and the public alike by creating 
new avenues for engagement with copyrighted works.  See id. at 1378. 
 5. 629 F.3d 928. 
 6. Id. at 941. 
3
Ard: Ard: Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
316 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
pioned by the free culture and free software movements.7  Yet rejection of the 
MDY approach leaves us to ask how courts might guard against licensors’ 
overreaching without falling into the same traps. 
This Article argues that the problems of overreach are greatest where li-
censors seek copyright enforcement of unexpected terms.  To counter these 
problems, courts ought to award copyright remedies only where the licensor 
has made its terms clear and salient to the licensee.  License conditions are 
typically buried in dense boilerplate that reasonable consumers refuse to 
read8: the opportunity costs of reading are substantial and can hardly be justi-
fied relative to the low value of most consumer transactions.9  This arrange-
ment sets consumers down the path to unwitting infringement and to hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of dollars in copyright damages no matter how trivial 
or unexpected the breached term.10  The award of copyright remedies in these 
circumstances is not only excessive from the perspective of consumer law, 
but also problematic for copyright itself due to its corrosive effect on the le-
gitimacy of the regime and the chill it casts over users’ engagement with 
creative works.11 
 
 7. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Software 
Licenses: The MDY Trio’s Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 
110 (2011); Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering Copyright, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1179, 1224-25 (2012); see also, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching 
and Concerning Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. 
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1083 (2011) (attempt-
ing to rehabilitate MDY’s approach with an alternative that would permit copyright 
enforcement only where doing so “would promote the purposes of the copyright 
holder’s exclusive rights” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does 
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (finding that “only one or two in 1,000 shoppers access a 
product’s [license] for at least 1 second”). 
 9. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1449, 1486 (2004) (“[T]he rational buyer will invest in information about a good 
(including information about the rights associated with it) only up to the point where 
marginal gains equal marginal cost.  For low-valued goods this investment would be 
very low.”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 971, 989 (2001) (explaining the non-drafter’s understanding of 
terms as “primarily a function of two observable facts: (1) the complexity and obscu-
rity of the term in question and (2) the size of the underlying transaction”). 
 10. See supra note 3. 
 11. It may be that courts will refuse to enforce penalties like these that offend 
their commitments to substantive fairness.  See generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle 
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 
(2000) (describing judicial reluctance to enforce overly-harsh laws).  It is nonetheless 
important that courts justify their decisions in ways that advance the development of 
copyright law and policy rather than confuse it.  MDY, for example, may have pro-
tected consumers against a substantively overreaching license condition.  But as Sec-
tion III.A argues below, the resulting nexus test has generated doctrinal confusion and 
threatens to impede innovations in licensing. 
4
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One immediate concern with directing courts to scrutinize the adequacy 
of notice is that copyright law, as it stands, lacks the doctrinal tools to ac-
count for notice defects.12  But this concern dissipates if we take seriously the 
contractual aspects of the license.  The question of whether a license term can 
be construed as a condition begins as an interpretive question for contract.13  
Contract law, moreover, is normatively and doctrinally responsive to the li-
censee’s expectations in ways copyright law is not.14  Contract law is loath to 
impose damages beyond those a party could expect as a result of breach, and 
it is all the more reluctant to enforce a term that would award supracompensa-
tory damages in the absence of unequivocal assent.15  The disproportionately 
large statutory damages that would result from licensors’ enforcement of 
conditions therefore ought to trigger significant concerns regarding the ade-
quacy of notice.  Courts could accordingly require these licensors, who seek 
to invoke remedies greater than what contract typically offers, to provide 
notice greater than what contract law ordinarily requires. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I begins by outlining the fea-
tures of copyright law that allow copyright owners to designate practically 
any license term as a condition.  It then explains how the high information 
costs posed by boilerplate license conditions create problems for both con-
sumer law and copyright policy.  Part II shows why copyright law lacks the 
tools to guard against these risks: copyright’s mandatory damages foreclose 
judges from tailoring damage awards to the breaching party’s actual culpabil-
ity following the breach of a trivial and poorly disclosed term, and conven-
tional copyright defenses like fair use, preemption, and misuse do not speak 
to failures of notice.  This Part also considers the mitigating effect of reputa-
tional constraints and finds them to be only a partial solution. 
Part III situates my approach against other proposals for the regulation 
of conditions.  It begins with a discussion of the MDY opinion, explaining 
why the Ninth Circuit’s nexus provides unclear guidance while also impeding 
innovations in licensing.  This Part then considers other substantive reforms, 
particularly the possibility of developing standardized terms.16  Standardiza-
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 10.15[A][1] (2013); see, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 
928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We distinguish between conditions and covenants accord-
ing to state contract law, to the extent consistent with federal copyright law and poli-
cy.”). 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Struc-
ture of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1081-83 (2009) (explaining con-
tract’s presumption against the recognition of supracompensatory conditions as a 
manifestation of contract’s antiforfeiture norm). 
 16. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling and Christina Mulligan spearhead this ap-
proach.  Van Houweling argues that copyright enforcement ought to be denied to 
terms that impose information costs higher than those established under copyright’s 
statutory baselines, see Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. 
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tion would have the benefit of protecting against runaway information costs 
by restricting the universe of possible terms.  And it is likely that smart new 
substantive limits could advance the goals of copyright by prohibiting those 
terms that would be problematic even when properly disclosed.  But insofar 
as the discussion pertains to how courts should approach conditions, it is 
doubtful that courts are in the best institutional position to identify the terms 
in need of substantive regulation or to update their holdings to keep pace with 
innovative developments in the practice of licensing.17  The Part concludes by 
considering proposals that would allow licensors to designate the terms of 
their choice as conditions.  While these approaches leave more room for in-
novations in licensing, they require some mechanism for addressing the high 
information costs posed by idiosyncratic license terms.  These scholars have 
attempted to locate such protections within copyright law, though they face 
difficulties due to copyright’s limited concern with notice.18  My own pro-
posal avoids these problems by identifying contract law itself as the doctrinal 
foundation for the notice inquiry. 
Part IV shows how contract law would allow courts to inquire into the 
adequacy of notice in licensing cases even without changes to copyright law.  
In particular, contract law’s existing presumption against conditions provides 
a roadmap for courts to follow in requiring heightened notice as a prerequisite 
to awarding the sorts of supracompensatory remedies that would follow from 
 
L.J. 885, 897-98 (2008), and Mulligan advances a similar account for the restriction of 
idiosyncratic terms, see Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intel-
lectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235, 275-84 (2012) [hereinafter Mulligan, Numer-
us Clausus]; see also Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Inter-
net of Things, (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 2,465,651, Mar. 31, 2015) 
[hereinafter Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes], available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465651 (extending the argument to IP-embedded 
goods like seeds, digital cameras, and Google Glass).  This Article differs in its ap-
proach to information costs by focusing not on the terms per se but their presentation. 
 17. See Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1204 (“Courts would be not only reluctant 
but also ill-equipped to devise a menu of standardized copyright interests.”); see also 
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that courts are “ill-equipped” to define the proper scope of a new intel-
lectual property right in news); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of 
Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 176, 214 (2013) (arguing that 
courts are “needed to deter opportunistic efforts by contracting parties to exploit their 
counterparties,” but that substantively “generalist courts are peculiarly ill-equipped to 
discover and understand the context that innovative parties have developed”). 
 18. Michael Kenneally, for example, would have courts pioneer new principles 
in copyright law to account for adequacy of notice.  See Kenneally, supra note 7, at 
1231-32, 1243.  In similar fashion, Robert Gomulkiewicz urges courts to be skeptical 
of adhesive licenses as part of a multifactor remedial inquiry.  See Gomulkiewicz, 
supra note 7, at 134-35.  Under existing law, this test might justify denial of an in-
junction, but it could not shield a licensee from copyright’s mandatory statutory dam-
ages.  See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. 
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recognizing license terms as conditions.  Part V applies this approach to con-
temporary copyright licenses.  Many of today’s boilerplate license conditions 
would likely not withstand heightened scrutiny.  But recent work on en-
hanced disclosure – particularly Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz’s “warning 
box” for unexpected, unfavorable terms – provides guidance for licensors 
trying to meet the burden of communicating their terms.19 
Beyond addressing the high information costs posed by idiosyncratic li-
cense terms, this approach also creates space for greater public examination 
of the terms that copyright owners are propounding.  Requiring heightened 
disclosure as a prerequisite to enforcing license terms in copyright forces 
them into the open.  This openness increases opportunities for consumers to 
discipline substantive overreach in the market, through public advocacy cam-
paigns, or by recourse to the political process.  Heightened transparency 
would also give lawmakers better purchase on the terms in need of regula-
tion.20 
I.  CONDITIONS IN COPYRIGHT 
Copyright owners have historically granted conditional licenses to their 
business partners, retaining the right to sue for infringement following speci-
fied forms of breach.  But the extension of conditional licenses to consumer 
 
 19. See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer 
Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553 (2014).  The problem and its solution can 
also be described as one of excessive error and information costs.  A user who mis-
takenly breaches a standard contractual promise is subject to error costs equal to any 
harm caused by the breach.  By contrast, a user who mistakenly violates a copyright-
enforceable term faces much higher costs due to the magnitude of copyright’s statuto-
ry damages.  While one who faces high error costs might ordinarily find it worthwhile 
to investigate her contractual obligations to avoid mistakes, the information costs 
associated with learning license conditions are themselves prohibitively high: licenses 
are lengthy, dense, and subject to constant revision, and a user may have to comply 
with a different license for each piece of software, e-book, and MP3 he encounters in 
a given day.  Cf. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 16, at 15-25 
(describing the absolute, relative, and aggregate information costs associated with 
restrictions on personal property).  A licensor who raises error costs by drafting copy-
right-enforceable terms ought to bear the burden of managing information costs by 
disclosing the operative terms in ways that users can actually understand. 
 20. While this Article advances a notice-based approach, the approach is com-
patible with proposals that are more sanguine about the need for courts to impose 
substantive protections.  Indeed, greater attention to notice would likely improve the 
quality of substantive analysis.  If courts first screened license terms to make sure 
they met the notice requirements proposed in this Article, they would strike many of 
the most egregious terms.  This form of scrutiny, moreover, would discipline consci-
entious firms into offering more reasonable terms prospectively.  Any terms that sur-
vived to the point of substantive adjudication would therefore already be scrubbed of 
notice defects that might skew the court’s analysis.  In other words, the approach 
would reduce the likelihood of “bad facts” making “bad law.” 
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copies of digital works is a more recent phenomenon.  Some of these new 
licensing forms might enhance public access to creative works by facilitating 
creative distribution models;21 others might burden the public’s engagement 
with creative works while providing few countervailing benefits.22  Regard-
less of their intended purpose, however, these license terms pose risks to con-
sumers who are unaware of them.  The following discussion explains how 
these terms are structured, how they give rise to the risk of unwitting in-
fringement, and why this risk is problematic for both consumer law and copy-
right. 
A.  Conditions Defined 
The word “condition” . . . is sometimes used in a very loose sense as 
synonymous with “term,” “provision,” or “clause.”  In such a sense it 
performs no useful service; instead, it affords one more opportunity 
for slovenly thinking. 
– Arthur L. Corbin23 
Courts and scholars use the term “condition” to refer to any license term 
where breach could result in copyright liability.24  This convention is useful 
shorthand, but it obscures the differences between two classes of terms that 
can lead to copyright liability: “scope limitations,” where infringement results 
from exercise of a right that was never granted; and “termination conditions,” 
where breach results in wholesale termination of the license.  The following 
discussion unpacks these categories and explains how restrictions like these 
can be imposed on consumers’ use of retail copies. 
 
 21. See, e.g., Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1206-11 (describing the potential bene-
fits of price discrimination in software); David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of 
F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 223-24 (2011) (defending experimentation 
with license terms as beneficial to free expression).  Subsection III.A.2 articulates the 
argument in favor of license innovation. 
 22. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 948 (describing license re-
strictions that would impair the goals of copyright law).  Section III.B articulates the 
arguments for imposing substantive limits on the terms that may be enforced in copy-
right. 
 23. Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743 
(1918). 
 24. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Chris-
topher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling Prop-
erty and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1152 
(2013) (“Accepted doctrine currently sorts license terms into two categories: condi-
tions and covenants.”). 
8
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1.  Limitations, Conditions, and Covenants 
Copyright law grants the copyright holder a bundle of exclusive rights.  
When Anne writes a book, she gains the exclusive rights to copy the book, 
create derivative works, distribute copies, or recite passages from it in pub-
lic.25  Anne can convey any permutation of these rights to another party via 
license. 
Anne can also convey more limited rights: she might license a publisher 
to make 10,000 copies or to vend the book in the United States.  The license 
would provide no defense against an infringement claim after the publisher 
made the 10,001st copy or began distributing the book in Canada.26  The pub-
lisher would be infringing Anne’s copyright not by violating the terms of the 
agreement per se, but by exercising rights that Anne never conveyed to it.27  
Terms like these are “scope limitations.” 
Anne can also draft license terms that allow for termination of the 
agreement in the event of breach.28  She might require the publisher to remit a 
certain percentage of net sales for her book each month or else lose its rights.  
Or she might grant film adaptation rights to a movie studio, with the proviso 
that the rights will automatically terminate if the studio does not complete the 
film within five years.  These terms function analogously to standard contract 
conditions – terms that govern the vesting or expiration of rights and duties29 
– but to clearly delineate these terms I refer to them as “termination condi-
tions.” 
Termination conditions give rise to infringement not in their breach, but 
in the licensee’s continued exercise of the licensed rights past the license’s 
termination.30  Consider what would happen if Anne’s publisher failed to 
make its required monthly payment.  Anne’s right to terminate the agreement 
would trigger, and she could likely sue in contract for the money owed.  The 
publisher would not be liable for copyright infringement, however, if it im-
mediately stopped printing and distributing the work.  Copyright liability 
would accrue only if the publisher exercised one of the author’s exclusive 
rights – i.e., copying or distribution – after losing authorization to do so. 
 
 25. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 26. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 10.15[A][2] (“[I]f a motion 
picture license is subject to the condition that its exhibition must occur at specified 
times and places, the licensee’s exhibitions at other times and places is without au-
thority from the licensor and therefore constitutes copyright infringement.”). 
 27. See Newman, supra note 24, at 1153 (explaining that these unauthorized 
actions would violate Section 106 even in the absence of a license). 
 28. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 10.15[A][3]. 
 29. See infra Section IV.C (describing conditions in contract and property law). 
 30. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 10.15[A][2].  Licensees some-
times benefit from a grace period during which to wind down their use of the work 
following termination.  See Geoscan, Inc. of Tex. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 
387, 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741 
(E.D. Mich. 1998). 
9
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The line between scope limitations and termination conditions is porous 
insofar as any scope limitation can also be designated as a termination condi-
tion.  The attribution requirement under a Creative Commons license, for 
example, is a scope limitation: the licensee’s authorization to create deriva-
tive works extends only to those that give proper credit to the original au-
thor.31  But the Creative Commons’ attribution term also operates as a termi-
nation condition: failure to comply with the license is designated as grounds 
for automatic termination.32 
The remaining terms of a license – those that are not scope limitations or 
termination conditions – are generally enforceable only in contract.33  Con-
tractual promises like these are usually referred to in the licensing context as 
“covenants.”34  Matters are complicated, however, in the event of material 
breach.  A court may permit the licensor to rescind the agreement upon mate-
rial breach of a covenant, effectively treating the covenant as a termination 
condition.35 
2.  Use Restrictions 
“Use” is not an exclusive right under the Copyright Act.36  Music dis-
tributors who encumbered vinyl records with a license specifying that the 
tracks must be played in order could not, accordingly, sue customers for play-
ing the album in reverse.  Nor could a publisher use copyright to enforce a 
restriction against skipping ahead in a hardcopy book. 
Comparable activities nonetheless create the possibility of infringement 
where digital works are involved.  Whenever a user runs software, reads an e-
book, or listens to an MP3, her computer copies some part of the work into its 
working memory (typically its Random-Access Memory or “RAM”).37  The 
 
 31. See Attribution 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (describing “License 
Conditions” in § 3). 
 32. Id. at § 6 (describing termination of the license). 
 33. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 34. See sources cited supra note 24. 
 35. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 10.15[A][3].  But see Newman, 
supra note 24, at 1156 (arguing the termination remedy ought to be available only for 
breach of express termination conditions). 
 36. Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 938; see Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM 
Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2010) (“To the extent copyright law has 
regulated use historically, it has done so through its display and performance rights.”). 
 37. Perzanowski, supra note 36, at 1068 (“Launching a software application, 
browsing the Internet, or sending an email results in the creation of at least one, and 
often several, potential copies in the random access memory (RAM) of computing 
devices.”).  Courts consistently hold that RAM copying implicates the Section 106(a) 
reproduction right.  Id.  Some RAM copies may be too evanescent to trigger liability.  
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir. 
2008) (finding no reproduction where buffered video existed for only 1.2 seconds 
10
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licensor who purports to impose a use restriction is conditioning the user’s 
right to make RAM copies on her adherence to the terms.  These restrictions 
sometimes take the form of scope limitations, permitting the user to make 
RAM copies only for certain uses.  Many licenses, for example, specify that 
software can only be used for “noncommercial” or “educational” purposes.38  
Some of these scope limitations restrict who may use the software: the Home 
and Student edition of Microsoft Office purports to allow shared use within a 
given household “by people for whom that is their primary residence.”39  
Microsoft’s copyright would ostensibly be infringed if a houseguest used that 
copy of Word to compose a letter.40 
License terms also take the form of termination conditions, specifying 
that the failure to comply will terminate the user’s permission to make any 
further RAM copies.  Conventional subscription arrangements – e.g., terms 
conditioning use on monthly payments of $15 – would fall into this camp.  
The licensor could also deploy termination conditions to secure non-monetary 
forms of compensation.  Consider a hypothetical user named Seth.  He might 
download a digital copy of The Interview41 subject to a license that purported 
to terminate whenever someone skipped the movie previews at the beginning 
of the film.42  Anyone who fast-forwarded the advertisements would risk 
 
before being automatically overwritten).  Technical accidents like these, however, do 
not provide reliable limitations for the doctrine.  Per Cartoon Network, video play-
back might be non-actionable because each frame is copied into memory only for a 
fraction of a second.  Id.  On the same logic, however, reading an e-book might create 
liability merely because the text lingers in the device’s memory until the user moves 
to the next page. 
 38. See, e.g., Autodesk Software for Students and Educators, AUTODESK, 
http://www.autodesk.com/education/free-software/all (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (of-
fering free licenses to students and educators for non-commercial use). 
 39. MICROSOFT CORP., SOFTWARE LICENSE TERMS FOR MICROSOFT OFFICE 2010 
§ 1(12), available at http://products.office.com/en-us/microsoft-software-license-
terms-for-microsoft-office-2010 (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 40. Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra note 16, at 265.  The apocryphal re-
quirement that consumers use the work only while wearing a red hat would also con-
stitute a scope limitation.  Cf. Newman, supra note 24, at 1154 (“[S]uppose I put up a 
sign at the boundary of Blackacre saying, ‘All persons wearing red hats may enter this 
property.’  If you enter without the prescribed headgear, you are a trespasser.”). 
 41. The Interview – a satirical film released in 2014 about the assassination of 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un – bears mentioning because many theaters refused 
to show the film following threats from the North Korean government.  See Ryan 
Faughnder, ‘Interview’ Could Make Online Film Releases Common, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 2014, at 1.  The majority of consumers who wished to see the film accordingly 
streamed or downloaded a digital copy subject to the terms of service for a site like 
Google Play, YouTube Movies, or Microsoft’s Xbox Video.  See id. 
 42. While this term is hypothetical, the idea of using copyright to safeguard 
one’s commercials is not so foreign to the entertainment industry as consumers might 
hope.  As a case in point consider Fox television’s recent suit against the Dish Net-
work, where it argued that Dish’s commercial-skipping devices facilitate copyright 
11
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committing copyright infringement by creating an unauthorized RAM copy in 
the course of screening the film.43  Many licenses also employ what might be 
called a “shotgun approach,” purporting to terminate upon breach of any term 
rather than limiting the termination right to a select number of material 
terms.44 
Congress recognized the potential for routine software use to create ac-
tionable reproductions when it enacted Section 117 of the Copyright Act.45  
The provision clarifies that it is not an infringement for the “owner of a copy 
of a computer program” to make copies “as an essential step in the utilization 
of the computer program.”46  Given full effect, this provision would insulate 
anyone who owned a copy of a digital work from liability for RAM copying 
during routine personal use.47  Its protections are limited, however, by courts’ 
willingness to define ownership narrowly: one who “licenses” a copy of a 
computer program may not “own” that copy for the purpose of immunity 
under Section 117.48  And courts that recognize this distinction often defer to 
the terms of the license itself in deciding whether the copy is owned or li-
censed, regardless of the economic realities of the transaction.49  Given con-
 
infringement.  See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 
1063-64 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 43. For purposes of this hypothetical, set aside the technological differences that 
might immunize video use from RAM copy liability relative to the use of software or 
e-books.  See supra note 37. 
 44. This approach cuts across free culture, free software, and proprietary licens-
es.  Examples include the Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license, Attribution 4.0 
International, supra note 31, at § 6(a) (“[I]f You fail to comply with this Public Li-
cense, then Your rights under this Public License terminate automatically.”), the GNU 
General Public License, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, INC., GNU GENERAL PUBLIC 
LICENSE VERSION 3, at § 8 (2008), available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html 
(“You may not propagate or modify a covered work except as expressly provided 
under this License.  Any attempt otherwise to propagate or modify it is void, and will 
automatically terminate your rights under this License (including any patent licenses 
granted under the third paragraph of section 11).”), and Amazon’s terms of use for the 
Kindle, Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 (last updated Sept. 6, 2012) (“Your rights 
under this Agreement will automatically terminate if you fail to comply with any term 
of this Agreement.  In case of such termination, you must cease all use of the Kindle 
Store and the Kindle Content . . . .”). 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Section 117 on its face applies only to “computer programs” and might not 
cover digitized novels, songs, or movies.  See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at 
§ 8.08[B][1] (“The current exemption applies solely to software.”).  The question of 
whether an MP3 listener is therefore at a disadvantage relative to the software user, 
however, is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
 48. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
 49. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We hold 
today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copy-
12
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sumers’ inattention to license terms – and the resulting lack of constraint on 
licensors’ ability to characterize the transaction any way they like – the wis-
dom of deferring to the license on this point is questionable.50 
Other courts have been more generous to users so long as they possess a 
physical copy of the work, such as an installation disc.  The Second Circuit in 
Krause v. Titleserv recognized that ownership “of a copy” for purposes of 
Section 117 speaks to ownership over the physical copies of the work, i.e., 
the discs.51  Under Krause, the fact that a party has “the right to continue to 
possess and use the programs forever” or even “to discard or destroy the cop-
ies any time it wished” is strong evidence that the party owns the copies.52  
Even the Second Circuit’s approach offers only limited protection, however, 
as networked transactions supplant the sale of discs.  We have entered an era 
where leading computer retailers like Apple no longer include DVD drives in 
their laptops.53  Krause’s focus on physical ownership of the copy offers no 
assurances regarding the application of Section 117 to copies that reside on a 
third party’s server, like those provided by cloud computing and streaming 
media services.54 
In any case, copyright owners’ potential to impose idiosyncratic use re-
strictions goes beyond the sorts of uses implicated by the RAM copy doc-
 
right owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts 
the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”); 
see also DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999); MAI, 991 F.2d at 518. 
  Brian Carver criticizes this approach sharply, arguing that “[t]he invented 
notion of ‘licensing’ software, where that means transferring perpetual possession of a 
copy but retaining title to the copy, is both incoherent and not found in the Copyright 
Act.”  Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: 
First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1954 (2010).  David 
Nimmer likewise criticizes courts for failing to distinguish between ownership of the 
copy and ownership of the copyright.  2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at 
§ 8.08[B][c][i] (“[W]hen a copyright owner of a software product sells diskettes of its 
copyrightable work to consumers, the customers may be licensees of the copyright, 
but as owners of the copy containing the computer program, they are duly vested with 
all rights under the Section 117 exemption.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 50. See infra Section I.B. 
 51. 402 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005); see also DSC, 170 F.3d at 1360 (refus-
ing to “adopt the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of all licensees as non-owners” but 
nonetheless concluding that “severe” license restrictions indicated a lack of owner-
ship); ZilYen, Inc. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass’n, 935 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(following Krause and DSC). 
 52. Krause, 402 F.3d at 124; see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at 
§ 8.08[B][c][i] (supporting this view); Carver, supra note 49, at 1954 (same). 
 53. See Jeff Ward-Bailer, Is Apple Declaring War on DVDs?, CHRISTIAN SCI.  
MONITOR (July 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2011/0728/Is-
Apple-declaring-war-on-DVDs (“[T]he company is eyeing a future in which media 
doesn’t come on a DVD – or a CD-ROM or Blu-Ray disc, for that matter.”). 
 54. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 8.12[B][1][d][iii]. 
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trine.  Consider the following examples.  First, the United Airlines website 
once claimed this limitation: “You may download one copy of these materials 
on any single computer and print a copy of the materials for your use in learn-
ing about, evaluating, or acquiring United’s service and products.”55  As Viva 
Moffat explains, a plausible reading of this agreement would prohibit the user 
from downloading or printing more than one copy of her itinerary.56  Even 
though this use deals with the creation and sharing of permanent, non-RAM 
copies, it clashes squarely with the customary practice of emailing one’s itin-
erary to family or to an administrative assistant, let alone printing a spare 
copy for travel.  Second, consider the fact that the terms for Seventeen maga-
zine’s website once stated that “you may not access or use the covered sites 
or accept the agreement if you are not at least 18 years old.”57  Seventeen, of 
course, is a magazine geared towards teenagers.  Finally, consider Apple’s 
license for the Windows version of Safari.  The terms permitted the user to 
install the software on only “a single Apple-labeled computer” even though 
the software was marketed for use on PCs running Windows.58 
To be sure, licensors can legitimately impose a range of restrictions on 
copying, access, or installation.  Indeed, the close “nexus” of these activities 
to copyright’s traditional protections might give consumers constructive no-
tice that they ought to look out for such restrictions.59  But the preceding ex-
amples are problematic because the licenses prohibit the very uses implicitly 
authorized in the transactions.60  The user who pays full retail price for an e-
 
 55. Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure 
of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 99 n.243 (2007) (quoting these 
terms). 
 56. Id. at 99.  For United to prevail on such a claim, however, it would have to 
overcome the user’s arguments that United had no claim to copyright in the factual 
matter of its itineraries and that printing a copy of one’s own itinerary is fair use. 
 57. Dave Maass, Kurt Opsahl & Trevor Timm, Until Today, If You Were 17, It 
Could Have Been Illegal To Read Seventeen.com Under the CFAA, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/ 
04/until-today-if-you-were-17-it-could-have-been-illegal-read-seventeencom-under-
cfaa. 
 58. Cade Metz, Apple Forbids Windows Users from Installing Safari for Win-
dows, REGISTER (Mar. 26, 2008, 7:31 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/26/ 
apple_safari_eula_paradox/.  While the act of installation does not involve RAM 
copying per se, it would still fall under the protection of Section 117 because installa-
tion is itself an “essential step” in utilizing a computer program.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117 
(2012). 
 59. See Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 936-37 (describing the “information-
intensive investigation” required prior to reproduction under the Copyright Act even 
when no license is involved); see also infra Part III (discussing different approaches 
to a “nexus” test for determining whether a term ought to be enforceable in copy-
right). 
 60. One might even argue that offering a product so unfit for its intended pur-
pose would make the licensor liable for vending a defective product.  Cf. James 
Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.J. 793, 813-14 (2010) (ar-
14
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book, MP3, or computer program likewise expects to be able to make reason-
able personal uses of the work.  Problems arise when licensors who tacitly 
understand these expectations seek to quietly disclaim them in the fine 
print.61  As the following Section shows, the sheer informational burden asso-
ciated with these idiosyncratic terms makes it difficult for consumers to pro-
tect themselves against such opportunism. 
B.  Copyright’s Boilerplate 
Practically speaking, no one reads copyright licenses.  Yannis Bakos, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David Trossen recently found that “only one 
or two in 1,000 shoppers access a product’s [license] for at least 1 second.”62  
In other words, only 0.1-0.2% of people take the time to even glance at the 
agreement.  Licensors can accordingly propound whatever terms they want 
without fear of market discipline.63  This finding is readily corroborated by 
anecdotal evidence – perhaps from your own experience – that people do not 
read before clicking “I Agree.”  If you are among the majority of users who 
neglect to read, you are in the company of our nation’s top jurists: Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts has publicly admitted he does not read online agreements.64 
 
guing that firms ought to design their offerings to be safe for the uses that people 
actually make of their products). 
 61. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (voiding any term 
where one party has reason to believe that the other was unaware of the term and 
would not have assented had she known of the term); Michael Seringhaus, E-Book 
Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” The Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 147, 202-03 (2010) (arguing e-book downloads from Amazon should be treated 
because they are advertised as sales). 
 62. Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 8, at 3.  Those who paused 
for at least one second, moreover, spent on average only 62.7 seconds viewing the 
text.  Id. at 21-22.  Given that the average license in the study was 2000 words, there 
is reason to doubt that even the 0.2% who stopped to view the terms took the time to 
read the agreements in full, let alone to inform themselves about the contents.  See id. 
 63. See id. at 3 (explaining that the number of consumers who read their agree-
ments “is orders of magnitude smaller” than it would need to be for an informed mi-
nority to effectively regulate the market).  Indeed, many scholars identify the com-
plexity and non-salience of disadvantageous mass-market terms as the root problems 
of boilerplate because they render the market ineffective at disciplining firms.  See, 
e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 23 (2012) (“Excessively complex contracts 
prevent effective comparison-shopping and thus inhibit competition.”); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2003) (“When a contract term [in a form contract] is non-
salient to most purchasers, the market check on seller overreaching is absent, and 
courts should be suspicious of the resulting term.”). 
 64. Andrew Malcolm, Chief Justice John Roberts on Tiny Type, L.A. TIMES 
BLOG (Oct. 20, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/.m/washington/2010/
10/chief-justice-john-roberts-state-of-the-union.html?p=1.  The non-reading phenom-
enon is not of course limited to the copyright context or even to low-value transac-
15
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1.  Information Costs 
Consumer ignorance of license terms should not come as a surprise giv-
en how burdensome they are to read.  The costs of reading are most visible in 
the aggregate.  Consider Adobe Flash Player, a free browser plug-in that al-
lows users to view various forms of online content subject to a 3500-word 
license.65  Assuming that users read at a pace of 250 words-per-minute, it 
would take fourteen minutes for each user to read the license.66  Adobe has 
claimed its software is installed as often as eight million times per day.67  If 
we expected all eight million daily users to read this agreement, then the op-
portunity cost of this obligation would be a cumulative 1.87 million hours per 
day.  That is 213 years.  And these are the costs imposed by just one day’s 
worth of installations for one piece of software that most Internet users take 
for granted.68  If the entire U.S. Internet-using population of 277 million read 
the agreement, the economy would lose over 55 million person-hours with 
hardly anything to show for it.69 
 
tions.  Judge Richard Posner notably declined to read the hundreds of pages of disclo-
sures that accompanied his own home-equity loan.  OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE 69-70 (2014). 
 65. Bob Dormon, Adobe Demands 7,000 Years a Day from Humankind: It’s All 
in the EULA Fine Print, REGISTER (Dec. 4, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.theregister
.co.uk/2012/12/04/feature_tech_licences_are_daft/. 
 66. The 250-word-per-minute rate is identified as the “typical reading rate for 
people with a high school education” in Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, 
The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 560 
(2008).  Given the dense nature of the text, however, there is reason to doubt that the 
average consumer would retain much information reading at this speed.  See James 
Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 197-98 (2013); see also 
BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 64, at 80-84, 86-91 (explaining that disclo-
sures tend to be written above the average user’s reading level and that even a highly 
skilled reader often lacks the sectoral literacy to understand technical terms). 
 67. See Dormon, supra note 65; Emmy Huang, Two! Four! Six! Eight! Numbers 
We Appreciate!, ADOBE BLOGS (Aug. 28, 2008), http://blogs.adobe.com/emmy/2008/
08/two_four_six_ei.html. 
 68. Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor pose a similar example by reference to 
the costs of reading privacy policies.  By their estimation, it would have taken the 
average Internet user 244 hours to read all the privacy policies she encountered in the 
year 2008.  McDonald & Cranor, supra note 66, at 563.  Taking into account the time 
value of money, the authors estimated that reading these agreements would have cost 
$3534 per American Internet user or a collective $781 billion.  Id. at 564.  This repre-
sents “an opportunity cost greater than the GDP of Florida.”  BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 64, at 27. 
 69. This estimate for Internet usage comes from multiplying the U.S. Census 
2014 population estimate of 318,857,056, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1.  ANNUAL 
ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, 
AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2014 (2014), available at http://www.
census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/2014/index.html, by the U.S. Census Internet 
16
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Reading costs can also be prohibitively high even with respect to any 
one transaction.  The sorts of works at issue here include $15 movies, $0.99 
MP3s, and a range of other downloads that cost less than a pizza.  Many are 
even free, like Adobe’s plug-in.  They often relate, moreover, to the user’s 
leisure activities.  Under these circumstances, the marginal costs of acquiring 
more information about a work – or any restrictions placed on it – quickly 
outstrip both the transaction’s benefits and the user’s expertise.70 
To make the point more concrete, let us return to Seth’s predicament in 
downloading a copy of The Interview for personal viewing.71  If his expected 
utility from viewing the film were $15, then he would break even if he paid 
$15 for a copy that was unencumbered by a license.  The opportunity costs 
entailed in reading the license make the transaction much less attractive.72  If 
Seth downloaded the film from iTunes, it would come encumbered by nearly 
15,000 words of boilerplate.73  Reading the license would take sixty 
minutes.74  Reading would not guarantee comprehension, however, given the 
complexity of the text.75  For Seth to truly understand his rights and obliga-
tions he might have to consult an attorney.  With the costs of reading and 
consultation factored in, the price of understanding the license would quickly 
exceed Seth’s expected benefits from viewing the film.76 
To be sure, Seth might amortize the search costs across several digital 
downloads.77  But even this strategy could be thwarted by Apple’s unilateral 
option to update its terms and conditions for future purchases.78  It would also 
be complicated by a lack of standardization among different video services.  
Seth might seek his next film through Amazon, Hulu, Netflix, or YouTube, 
each of which carries its own terms.  The terms might purport to hold him 
 
usage estimate of 74.4%, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET ACCESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf.  Using the World Bank’s estimate of 84.2% 
U.S. Internet usage would yield even greater losses to productivity.  See Internet Us-
ers (Per 100 People), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.
USER.P2 (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 70. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 1486; see also Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 
19, at 574-75 (describing consumers’ reading strategies). 
 71. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
 72. On a parallel track, the license restrictions might result in a lower-quality 
viewing experience and thereby reduce the utility of the work itself to less than $15.  I 
focus here only on the search costs of learning the restrictions, though the total gains 
to Seth would also be impacted by any reduction in quality imposed by the terms. 
 73. See Terms and Conditions, APPLE ITUNES STORE, http://www.apple.com/
legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 74. This figure assumes the 250-word-per minute rate identified by McDonald 
and Cranor.  See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 75. See sources cited supra note 66. 
 76. Cf. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 16, at 20 (“It’s simp-
ly not worth spending $200 to discover how one can use the $100 glassware.”). 
 77. See Gibson, supra note 66, at 201 n.101. 
 78. Id. 
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liable as a copyright infringer for normal uses of the work, such as fast-
forwarding through any advertisements, or they might be perfectly consistent 
with his expectations.  But Seth could not know until he invested time into 
reading the fine print.79 
2.  Behavioral Constraints 
Reading costs are high.  So too are the penalties for breach, where li-
censes are enforceable on pain of infringement liability: even the unwitting 
infringer who caused no actual damages in breach would likely owe a mini-
mum of $750 in statutory damages.80  The rational, risk-averse consumer 
might anticipate the potential for liability and take pains to avoid overreach-
ing licenses.  But behavioral accounts of consumer decision-making suggest 
that most users are likely to simply accept the terms, albeit with flawed un-
derstandings of their agreements. 
License conditions lack salience insofar as these terms are not the ones 
that users pay attention to when deciding whether or not to acquire a copy-
righted work.  This is partly because the terms are not prominent.  Blizzard 
does not advertise to prospective customers that its license strictly prohibits 
cheating at its game, let alone that it intends to treat breach as an act of copy-
right infringement.81  Nor does Apple trumpet the fact that its operating sys-
tem license purports to terminate all rights automatically upon any breach of 
its terms.82  For their part, consumers have little reason to anticipate such 
severe conditions: consumer licenses are relatively new and (for now) en-
forced rarely against the end user. 
These terms also lack salience because they deal with the sort of contin-
gent events that consumers tend to systematically discount or ignore.  Even 
assuming that users read licenses more carefully, consumers’ optimism bias 
may lead them to discount the likelihood that they will be sued in the event of 
breach.83  The risk of incurring copyright’s high statutory damages may be 
 
 79. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 27 (2000) (“[B]y 
allowing even one person to create an idiosyncratic property right, the information 
processing costs of all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type of 
property go up.”). 
 80. See infra Section II.A. 
 81. See generally MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 82. See APPLE INC., SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR OS X MAVERICKS § 6 
(2013), available at http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/OSX109.pdf (“Your rights 
under this License will terminate automatically or otherwise cease to be effective 
without notice from Apple if you fail to comply with any term(s) of this License.”). 
 83. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 63, at 22-23 (“Optimistic consumers tend to 
underestimate the probability of triggering contingent, future costs.”).  The same 
optimism might also cause users to discount the likelihood of breach occurring; the 
user who is optimistic about the quality of the work might not be troubled by a “no 
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downplayed, moreover, due to consumers’ myopic tendency to discount fu-
ture costs.84  And the complexity of these agreements – lengthy and dense as 
they are – raises the prospect that even a user who read the license would 
simply be ignorant that breach could give rise to copyright damages.85  In-
deed, an opportunistic firm can use complexity as a weapon to bury disadvan-
tageous terms like these, hiding them from all but the most determined and 
sophisticated users.86 
3.  Consequences for Consumers and Copyright 
Copyright licenses exacerbate the usual problems associated with adhe-
sive licenses.  As with other boilerplate, consumers are in a poor position to 
monitor these deals because the licenses are too dense relative to the value of 
the transaction to merit careful study.87  But breach of these terms is poten-
tially much worse for the consumer than breach of the typical contractual 
term.  Rather than expose users to actual damages, or perhaps to forfeiture of 
the work they paid for, copyright-enforceable terms carry damages that are 
orders of magnitude greater than the value of a retail copy: copyright’s statu-
tory damages start with a mandatory minimum of $200 and can run as high as 
$150,000.88  Given the likely unavailability of the innocent infringement de-
fense in cases of license breach, moreover, the floor for damages would likely 
start at $750.89  Even assuming that the licensor has a valid interest in enforc-
 
criticism” condition just as the user who overestimates her videogame skills might 
think nothing of a restriction on cheating. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 21-22. 
 85. See supra note 66. 
 86. See BAR-GILL, supra note 63, at 18 (“Complexity hides the true cost of the 
product from the imperfectly rational consumer.”); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra 
note 64, at 164 (“[D]isclosers can disclose too much, exploiting the overload prob-
lem.”); Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 574 (explaining firms’ incentives to 
“bury” undesirable terms); see also Malcolm, supra note 64 (relating Chief Justice 
Roberts’ conclusion that “providing too much information defeats the purpose of 
providing any, since no one ends up reading it”). 
 87. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 88. See infra Sections II.A, V.A (explaining copyright’s mandatory damages 
scheme).  Terms like these are the other side of the coin to the hidden exculpatory 
terms that Margaret Radin singles out for criticism in Boilerplate.  A firm that suc-
cessfully insulates itself for liability for its own negligence in a low-value transaction 
might deprive a surprised accident victim of hundreds of thousands of dollars in dam-
ages, if not millions.  MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, 
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW xv-xvi, 182-86 (2013).  A firm that suc-
cessfully enforced a license term in copyright could impose massive liability on the 
user directly. 
 89. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
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ing the underlying restrictions, it is doubtful that this system of hidden liabil-
ity is efficient in ensuring compliance.90 
The problems of unwitting infringement go beyond consumer law to 
hinder the goals of copyright itself.  Copyright’s statutory damages are high 
because they are meant to deter infringement.91  But even the most draconian 
license term could not deter users who did not understand the license’s obli-
gations or the costs of breach.  Indeed, the imposition of unexpectedly high 
damages might prove counterproductive for compliance with copyright.  To 
the extent that these remedies are seen as arbitrary and unfairly distributed, 
they risk diminishing copyright’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.92  This 
perception could undermine the deterrence goal by reducing voluntary com-
pliance, particularly in circumstances where there was little likelihood that 
infringement or breach would be detected.93 
Consider next how the risk of unwitting infringement could contribute 
to underutilization of copyrighted works.  While many users would stumble 
unwittingly into infringement, the conscientious user might understand the 
risks posed by unknown terms.  To avoid these risks, this user might go so far 
as to avoid using any work prior to studying the license in detail.  This strate-
gy would be quite costly, and there is little to commend this use of people’s 
time.  Indeed, conscientious readers would need to read the license even for 
works that carried no conditions, because they could not know which licensed 
works were so encumbered without first reading them.94  Consumers would 
live in a world of widespread uncertainty as to their rights, where the safe 
response, given limited time for reading, would often be to simply forego 
 
 90. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 104 (1989) (arguing that con-
sumers can only undertake efficient precaution against breach when they understand 
the scope of their liability). 
 91. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 3, at 499 (“Deterrence is . . . a legit-
imate goal of statutory damage awards, and Congress unquestionably intended for 
them to have this purpose.”). 
 92. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15-18 (2010) 
(explaining how overreaching by copyright owners has already contributed to the 
erosion of copyright law’s legitimacy). 
 93. Accord id. at 18 (“A public that complies with copyright only because it’s 
afraid of the copyright police will soon find ways to evade or restrain the copyright 
police.”); Rachel Storch, Copyright Vigilantism, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 453, 476 
(2013) (arguing that failures of legitimacy undermine deterrence in the copyright 
context); Tom. R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychologi-
cal Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 219, 229-30 (1997) (contrasting the 
inefficacy of a simple deterrence regime with the effectiveness of one where the law 
is seen as legitimate and consonant with popular intuitions regarding fairness); see 
also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (explaining the fundamental 
importance of legitimacy for voluntary compliance with law). 
 94. See supra note 79. 
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many lawful uses rather than undertake the effort required to investigate 
which uses were permissible.95 
Underutilization is a common byproduct of use restrictions, but it is par-
ticularly troubling for copyright.  Copyright’s foremost goal – and constitu-
tional mandate – is to advance the progress of knowledge and culture.96  Indi-
vidual users play a key role in this project.  As Julie Cohen explains, consum-
ers are not mere vessels for the appreciation of others’ work; rather, everyday 
users contribute to the development of knowledge and culture by using copy-
righted works to communicate with others, to grow personally, and to engage 
in processes of “play” that yield new and unexpected meanings and in-
sights.97  Jack Balkin, in his work on cultural participation, and Lawrence 
Lessig, in his work on remix culture, develop similar accounts of the im-
portance of users’ engagement.98 
Some of this engagement is protected by the fair use doctrine, particu-
larly where it favors works that are transformative, parodies and criticisms 
that cast a work in a new light, or forms of reverse engineering that allow the 
user to understand others’ software and design interoperable works.99  Ac-
cordingly, one way in which license restrictions are problematic is that they 
can create uncertainty as to whether the exercise of otherwise fair uses might 
trigger a penalty under the license.100 
 
 95. See Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra note 16, at 264-65 (describing how 
uncertainty as to licensed rights leads to underuse). 
 96. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2580-81 (2009). 
 97. Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 347, 372 (2005); see also JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: 
LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 94-95 (2012) (arguing that these 
serendipitous encounters “are sources of dissonance, provocation, meaning, and un-
expected beauty” and that “[s]ustaining the conditions for these encounters should be 
a central goal of any system of copyright law”). 
 98. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (“In a demo-
cratic culture people are free to appropriate elements of culture that lay to hand, criti-
cize them, build upon them, and create something new that is added to the mix of 
culture and its resources.”).  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART 
AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) (articulating the cultural 
and economic progress advanced by people using new digital tools to create and re-
mix elements of shared culture). 
 99. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he 
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the crea-
tion of transformative works.”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that reverse engineering of videogame software led to 
“growth in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works 
and the unprotected ideas contained in those works”). 
 100. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (explaining how prohibitions 
on fair use rights could lay the groundwork for an infringement action by triggering 
termination of the license).  This concern is not merely theoretical: licenses already 
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But these processes of cultural production also depend on the exercise of 
much more basic rights to access, share, and experiment with works.  These 
are uses that – in the absence of contemporary licensing practices – ordinarily 
would not implicate the Copyright Act.  Recall the Microsoft Office license 
that threatens to treat your houseguests as infringers merely for using your 
copy of Word.101  Imagine how engagement with creative works would be 
chilled if similar restrictions loomed over everyday practices of social en-
gagement with works, like the home screening of a digitally downloaded film 
for friends.  Or recall Blizzard’s attempt to treat cheating at its videogame as 
copyright infringement.102  There is no end to the sorts of idiosyncratic (but 
stifling) terms that could follow the same mold: no skipping ahead in this e-
book, no playing tracks out of order from this MP3 album, no playing video 
game avatars of a different gender than one’s own.  Allowing for unchecked 
copyright liability could impair progress by casting legal uncertainty over all 
but the most straightforward and banal uses of digital works. 
Finally, consider how the enforcement of these terms facilitates substan-
tive overreaching by copyright owners.  Users would be rightfully offended at 
licensors’ arrogance in treating many routine personal uses as the basis for an 
infringement suit.  In theory, their individual and collective decisions to reject 
these licenses would act as a check against the most egregious of these terms.  
But users can only exercise this sort of power where they are aware of the 
terms.  Practically all of us have agreed to license terms that feature idiosyn-
cratic grounds for copyright liability, perhaps even terms that treat each and 
every possible breach as infringing.103  Copyright owners’ ability to enact 
these terms without facing market discipline opens the door for the worst 
sorts of “private legislation”: rewriting the Copyright Act to suit owners’ ends 
at the expense of the public.104  This Part has argued that consumers are poor-
ly equipped to discipline these terms in the market; the next Part shows that 
copyright’s defenses likewise do little to protect the public against the harsh 
effects of boilerplate license terms. 
 
restrict fair use, though they are conventionally understood to do so on pain of con-
tractual liability rather than infringement liability.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a contractual ban on reverse 
engineering). 
 101. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
 102. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 103. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting 
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 112 
(2006) (“To enforce such private legislation could have the effect of granting copy-
right owners a monopoly in the expression of their ideas, removing material from the 
public domain and harming the public.”). 
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II.  COPYRIGHT AND UNWITTING INFRINGEMENT 
Copyright law protects against some forms of substantive overreaching 
by copyright owners.  The conventional copyright defenses are poorly suited, 
however, to account for notice defects in the presentation of a license.  As the 
following discussion explains, these difficulties arise because copyright law 
offers few opportunities for courts to consider equitable factors – such as 
deficiencies in notice – in determining liability or in fashioning remedies 
once liability is found.105 
A.  Statutory Damages and the Innocent Infringement Defense 
Taking it at name value, one would suppose that the innocent infringe-
ment defense was ideally suited to address the risk of unwitting infringement.  
Indeed, a court might conclude that the massive information costs posed by a 
license would establish that a user’s ignorance was reasonable, a factor re-
quired to substantiate the defense.106  But Subsection 401(d) of the Copyright 
Act preempts this argument.  When a work bears a valid copyright notice, the 
Subsection states that “no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s inter-
position of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual 
or statutory damages.”107  This provision – which goes to whether the user 
ought to know the work is copyrighted (as practically every work on the mar-
ket is) – is entirely tangential to whether the user ought to know whether a 
given use is prohibited by license.  But taken at face value, Subsection 401(d) 
would be fatal to the licensee’s invocation of the defense so long as the li-
censed work bore a copyright notice.108 
 
 105. This account follows on prior work showing copyright’s disregard for infor-
mation costs and uncertainty borne by consumers, including work that critiques the 
uncertainty inherent to copyright’s lax notice and renewal requirements, see R. An-
thony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM.  
J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007) (arguing that copyright’s protections against accidental in-
fringement – like copyright’s notice and renewal provisions – have reached a low 
point), and work problematizing the lack of ex ante guidance available under the fair 
use doctrine, see, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 
(2007); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003); see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 890-91, 898-900 
(2007) (explaining how the apparent indeterminacy of fair use and other copyright 
doctrines allows copyright owners to claim rights that are more expansive than those 
provided by statute). 
 106. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 14.04[B][2][a] & n.77. 
 107. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (2012). 
 108. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 14.04[B][2][a] (“[E]ven an 
innocent defendant generally cannot remit statutory damages below the mandatory 
minimum, unless the subject work was unpublished, bore an invalid notice, or was 
inaccessible to that defendant.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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The innocent infringement defense would offer only limited relief even 
if courts were to set aside Subsection 401(d).  Whereas copyright ordinarily 
imposes mandatory statutory damages of at least $750 per work infringed, the 
innocent infringement defense reduces this floor to $200.109  Even against the 
innocent defendant, the court may still award damages up to the ordinary 
maximum of $30,000.110  In an exhaustive study of copyright’s statutory 
damages, moreover, Pam Samuelson and Tara Wheatland found “only . . . 
two cases in which a court ever awarded statutory damages in an amount 
lower than the ordinary infringement minimum” (i.e., within the reduced 
range permitted upon a finding of innocent infringement).111 
Many users would suffer disproportionately high damages if they were 
subject only to the minimum award of $200.  Assume that when Seth skips 
the advertisements in The Interview, he causes the licensor actual damages of 
$1 under an arrangement whereby it is paid per-view by the advertisers.112  
An award of $200 under these circumstances seems so excessive as to offend 
the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, which prohibits 
statutory penalties “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate 
to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”113  And viewed as punitive dam-
ages, the 200:1 ratio is far in excess of the “single-digit ratio between puni-
tive and compensatory damages” condoned by the Court.114  Seth therefore 
might have a non-frivolous due process defense – indeed, some courts have 
expressly recognized its potential viability115 – but I have found no reported 
case where a defendant prevailed in challenging copyright’s statutory damag-
es on due process grounds. 
 
 109. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 110. 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 14.04[B][2][a].  A finding of inno-
cent infringement is mutually exclusive, at least, with a finding of willful infringe-
ment.  See id. at § 14.04[B][1][a] (delineating the three levels of culpability).  The 
innocent infringer would therefore be spared the risk of facing willful infringement’s 
enhanced damages of up to $150,000.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 111. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 3, at 474-75 (emphasis added). 
 112. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (introducing a hypothetical 
prohibition on fast-forwarding through commercials). 
 113. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); see 
Sony BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying this 
test to evaluate copyright’s statutory damages). 
 114. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.  Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); 
see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 3, at 472-73 (applying the Court’s ju-
risprudence).  The question of whether the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is 
relevant to the evaluation of statutory damages, however, is contested.  See, e.g., 
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d at 70-71 (rejecting this test); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra 
note 3, at 491-97 (weighing the arguments on either side). 
 115. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 3, at 471 n.163 (collecting cases 
where courts recognized the potential viability of the defense).  But see Tenenbaum, 
719 F.3d 67 (rejecting the application of the Supreme Court’s punitive damages juris-
prudence and upholding statutory damages of $22,500 per MP3 in a file-sharing 
case). 
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To be sure, statutory damages of $200 sound like they belong in small 
claims court.116  Yet on a per-work basis even a small award can accumulate 
towards ruinous results.  Say that Melody lawfully downloads a library of 100 
MP3s from a service that allows her to copy her collection to up to five de-
vices she personally owns.  She might inadvertently transgress this limitation 
by copying the files to a sixth device (perhaps she attempted to delete the 
songs from a prior MP3 player but failed), or by copying her entire hard drive 
to a cloud-based system recovery service (the third-party backup server 
would not be a device that she owned).  If she were found liable as an inno-
cent infringer, the court would be obligated to award statutory damages of at 
least $20,000. 
B.  Fair Use 
Fair use is one of few copyright exceptions where Congress authorizes 
the courts to exercise discretion.117  When the defense is successful, moreo-
ver, the defendant is wholly insulated from copyright liability.118  The doc-
trine nonetheless offers limited assistance to licensees.  To be sure, fair use 
limits the terms that may be enforced as scope limitations.  Fair use establish-
es that the public may make certain uses of a work – including activities like 
parody, critical commentary, and reverse engineering – without the author’s 
permission.119  The defense must be established on the facts of each case, but 
for purposes of illustration assume that reverse engineering a word processor 
is fair use.  A software developer would enjoy the right to reverse engineer a 
word processor as a matter of fair use even if the license were silent on the 
matter.  By the same token, the software developer would be immune from 
infringement liability even if the license prohibited reverse engineering.  The 
developer’s right to reverse engineer simply would not be the licensor’s to 
give or take. 
But fair use does little to prevent the same prohibitions from serving as 
termination conditions.  As a matter of contract, the law enforces licenses that 
prohibit activities like reverse engineering or even public criticism of copy-
righted works.120  Accepting that contractual limits on fair use are legally 
 
 116. Indeed, the U.S. Copyright Office has requested authority to create a special 
administrative tribunal for infringement cases valued at no more than $30,000 in 
damages.  See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013), available at http://copyright.gov/
docs/smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf. 
 117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 577 (1994) (“The fair use doctrine thus permits [and requires] the courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 119. See generally 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 13.05. 
 120. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-28 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (enforcing a contractual restriction on reverse engineering); Video Pipeline, 
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permissible, no established doctrine in copyright law stops licensors from 
designating these restrictions as conditions of termination for the agreement 
rather than ordinary covenants.  Consider what would happen if the license 
for a word processing program purported to terminate whenever a licensee 
attempted to reverse engineer it.  The act of reverse engineering would still 
not itself constitute infringement, but it would end the license.  If the licensee 
continued to make normal use of the software after reverse engineering, that 
licensee would risk creating infringing RAM copies.121  This would put the 
licensee in the unenviable position of having to choose between exercising 
his fair use rights or continuing to use the software for its intended pur-
pose.122  Something beyond fair use itself would be required to prevent licen-
sors from conditioning access to their works on the waiver of fair use rights. 
C.  Preemption and Misuse 
Preemption doctrine prohibits copyright holders from leveraging the 
tools of state law – like contract – in ways that create rights equivalent to 
 
Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (endorsing a 
license term that prohibited criticism of a film company or its films); Moffat, supra 
note 55, at 49 (positing that “online contracts almost universally purport to limit the 
otherwise fair use of copyrighted works”).  Courts’ enforcement of these agreements 
has drawn severe criticism.  See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged 
Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Mis-
use, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 530-31 (2004); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary 
N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 67 
(1999) (“Given that the statute itself carves fair use out of the scope of monopoly 
granted the copyright owner, the copyright owner cannot require a user to contract out 
of fair use.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 121. This circumstance parallels the situation where an author terminates a book 
publishing deal on account of the publisher’s failure to remit royalties.  The publisher 
would not be committing copyright infringement by failure to pay, but it would be if 
it continued to reproduce and distribute the book without the author’s permission.  See 
supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
 122. Sometimes the licensee’s choice seems easy.  Imagine that a publisher re-
leases an ill-advised e-book novelization of Springtime for Hitler (you may recall this 
title from Mel Brooks’ The Producers, where it was a play that was supposed to flop).  
The license might specify that the reader’s rights terminate if she exercises her fair 
use right to publicly criticize the work.  Presumably the reader who hates the book 
will suffer little personal harm if she forfeits continued access to the book after pan-
ning it.  The restriction nonetheless remains problematic insofar as a diminution in 
access hinders the reader’s attempts to communicate just how bad the book is to the 
larger public, to say nothing of the problems that would be occasioned if the license 
were drafted not to provide for termination but instead for contractual liability follow-
ing criticism.  Daniel R. Cahoy, Oasis or Mirage?: Efficient Breach as a Relief to the 
Burden of Contractual Recapture of Patent and Copyright Limitations, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 135 (2003) (arguing that few users would risk contractual liability to exer-
cise a fair use right); Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1082 (describing the negative 
externalities that arise from restrictions on fair use). 
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those protected in copyright, or rights that otherwise frustrate the objectives 
of the Copyright Act.123  Misuse doctrine prevents copyright holders from 
using their exclusive rights to regulate unrelated conduct, particularly where 
their exercise of power would have anticompetitive effects.124  The courts 
have seldom applied these principles to strike contracts that restrict fair use or 
otherwise rejigger the rights provided by the Copyright Act.125  But even a 
robust application of these doctrines would provide an incomplete answer to 
the information costs and ignorance surrounding consumer copyright licens-
es. 
1.  Preemption 
The preemption defense as applied by the courts would provide little 
protection to licensees.  Most courts begin and end their analysis with Section 
301 of the Copyright Act, which preempts state rights “equivalent to any of 
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.”126  The typical 
inquiry is not particularly deep.  Consider the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, where the plaintiff won enforcement of a contrac-
tual prohibition on the reproduction and distribution of phone records that 
were ineligible for copyright protection.127  The court held, notwithstanding 
the apparent equivalence between these prohibitions and copyright’s protec-
tion of reproduction and distribution, that contractual protections are not 
 
 123. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 1.01[B]. 
 124. See id. at § 13.09[A]. 
 125. See, e.g., Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325-28 (enforcing a restriction on reverse 
engineering notwithstanding a preemption argument); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 
203-06 (enforcing a restriction on criticism over a misuse argument).  A deep current 
in copyright scholarship argues that courts ought to wield the preemption and misuse 
doctrines more assertively to police against license terms that are substantively over-
reaching, particularly those that interfere with fair use.  See, e.g., Loren, supra note 
120, at 535 (arguing for a presumption of misuse when licensors contract for rights 
greater than those provided in the Copyright Act); Moffat, supra note 55, at 108-09 
(arguing for preemption of terms that prohibit fair use); Nimmer et al., supra note 
120, at 23 (“[A]ttempts at altering the delicate balance struck by copyright law should 
fail under the doctrine of preemption . . . .”).  While the courts have not taken up this 
call, these doctrines could provide the hook for the various substantive limits dis-
cussed below in Section III.B.  Such limits would provide an incomplete answer to 
the problem of information costs, however, for the reasons described there.  For the 
sake of parsimony, the present Section discusses whether these doctrines might play a 
role in regulating licenses apart from their role in supporting new substantive tests. 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012); Nimmer et al., supra note 120, at 52 (criticizing a 
court for its failure to look past Section 301 to other constitutional preemption princi-
ples). 
 127. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.  Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding just five years prior that telephone records were unpro-
tected by copyright). 
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equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright because they bind only the 
parties to the contract and not the public at large.128 
ProCD has sustained considerable criticism for this poorly theorized 
distinction.129  The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning has nonetheless been extend-
ed to justify prohibitions on traditional fair uses like reverse engineering.130  
The same rationale could be extended to justify other conditions that inter-
fered with fair use. 
Consumers would surely face less risk of unwitting infringement if the 
courts adopted a different tack and wielded the preemption doctrine to strike 
substantively dubious license restrictions.  Courts could reduce consumers’ 
information costs by categorically prohibiting licensors from designating 
restrictions on fair use as termination conditions.  They might go even further 
in preempting terms that seemed to alter the express entitlements provided by 
the Copyright Act.  Under this approach, users could take comfort in know-
ing, for example, that they could screen a film at a private gathering – so long 
as they did not cross the line into public performance – without worrying that 
the license might prohibit screening the film for houseguests. 
This more vigorous preemption doctrine would nonetheless provide an 
incomplete answer so long as licensors could impose unexpected and idio-
syncratic restrictions that were tangential to the preemption doctrine’s sub-
stantive concerns.  The doctrine would have little to say to a prohibition on 
cheating while playing a videogame or a requirement that users wear a literal 
red hat while reading the e-book edition of Red Hat for Dummies;131 terms 
 
 128. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (“[C]ontracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”). 
 129. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intel-
lectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 140 n.29 (1999) (finding it “trou-
bling that the rationale of ProCD means that contract terms should never be preempt-
ed”); Nimmer et al., supra note 120, at 50 (arguing that the contract in ProCD should 
have failed because it “complain[ed] directly about the reproduction right”); see also 
Michael E. Kenneally, Misappropriation and the Morality of Free Riding at 34-39 
(SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 2,310,966, Feb. 22, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2310966 (forthcoming 18 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. (2015)) (offering a more thoughtful account of the difference between 
the in rem duties of copyright and the in personam duties of contract).  The practical 
difference between a right against the user and a right against the world, meanwhile, 
grows ever smaller as more works are made available only subject to a license, cast-
ing doubt on the court’s conclusion that contractual rights do not impose on the public 
at large.  See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 55, at 69-70 (“Private contract rights that seek 
to restrict fair uses become exclusive rights when the contract terms apply to anyone 
who wishes to have access to the copyrighted work.”); Van Houweling, supra note 16 
(comparing license agreements that bind all comers to servitudes). 
 130. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (upholding a contractual restriction on reverse engineering); see also Cahoy, 
supra note 122, at 155 (collecting cases that have followed ProCD’s lead). 
 131. Such a term would of course be ironic given that Red Hat, Inc. is a major 
developer of open source software that is usually licensed subject to terms that are 
friendly to the public. 
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like these are neither equivalent to the rights provided under the Copyright 
Act nor directly contrary to them.  At best, preemption would eliminate a 
subset of substantively problematic conditions that happened to impose high 
information costs.  It would not confront the problem of information costs 
directly. 
2.  Misuse 
Copyright misuse vindicates concerns similar to those of preemption: it 
reaches conduct where copyright holders attempt to extend their monopolies 
in ways that offend copyright policy.132  Like preemption, it could be extend-
ed to strike restrictions on fair use.133  And it provides strong relief.  Whereas 
the preemption defense merely strikes down the offending term, misuse bars 
the copyright holder from enforcing its copyright at all until such time as the 
misuse is purged.134  Beyond protecting fair use, the misuse doctrine might 
restrict licensors’ ability to impose conditions that were far afield from their 
legitimate interests in controlling the licensed work.  This extension would 
stem from the doctrine’s historical aversion to tying arrangements like those 
that would condition access to a copyrighted work on the consumer’s pur-
chase of an unrelated good or service.135 
This application of the misuse doctrine would reduce information costs, 
but like preemption it offers only a partial solution.  It might stop a copyright 
owner from demanding that you buy a specific brand of cereal or avoid com-
petitors’ products as a condition of using a particular work; these activities 
offend the antitrust principles that the misuse defense is meant to vindicate.  
More controversially, it might be used to invalidate licenses conditioned on 
the user’s agreement to abstain from cheating at a videogame or to don crim-
son headgear: a court could hold that the licensor simply has no legitimate 
interests in these rather trivial aspects of its customers’ behavior.  But unless 
the doctrine were reoriented to consider notice rather than focus on substance, 
users would remain burdened with the risk of unwitting infringement for any 
poorly disclosed term that passed substantive muster.136 
 
 132. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990); 4 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 13.09[A]. 
 133. See Loren, supra note 120, at 530-31 (arguing terms that restrict fair use 
should give rise to a presumption of misuse). 
 134. See id. at 500-01. 
 135. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 13.09[A][b].  But see Apple 
Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the argument of copy-
right misuse where Apple restricted use of its operating system to computers it manu-
factured). 
 136. Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers plants the seed for such a reorientation.  407 
F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969).  In that case, the court interposed an unclean hands defense 
against infringement where a music-licensing agency failed to respond to the defend-
ant’s inquiry regarding which songs were covered under the agency’s public-
performance license.  Id. at 507 & n.7.  One could imagine an extension of this prin-
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D.  Reputational Constraints 
Finally, some might argue that the concern with copyright-enforceable 
terms is overblown.  The argument would be that, despite copyright’s lack of 
formal protections, market pressures curb licensors’ overreaching.  Granted, 
too few people read these agreements for consumers to discipline copyright 
owners through their purchasing decisions.137  Yet consumers might still be 
protected by the exercise of discretion on the part of copyright holders.  We 
should not expect full-blown copyright lawsuits for breach of trivial terms, 
the argument goes, because these suits would damage the copyright holder’s 
reputation. 
Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner advance an argument like this re-
garding one-sided contracts.138  They argue that firms reserve strong rights in 
their boilerplate agreements, but that for reputational reasons they typically 
excuse minor transgressions.139  The harsh terms are weapons that these firms 
reserve against opportunistic customers who might attempt to take advantage 
of the firm.140  Indeed, these terms might benefit customers as a whole insofar 
as they allowed the firm to deflect any costs that would otherwise be imposed 
by opportunistic customers rather than spreading those costs across the entire 
pool. 
Bebchuk and Posner are careful to note, however, that their argument 
depends on a market where firms are repeat players who compete on the basis 
of reputation.141  So perhaps consumers can trust major firms like Amazon 
and Adobe not to initiate federal litigation over minor violations.  But the 
 
ciple where licensors’ poor presentation of terms would support the same defense.  
Cf. id. at 507 n.7 (likening the agency’s duty to the general requirement that authors 
print copyright notices on their works); see also Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San 
Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (“The defense of unclean 
hands by virtue of copyright misuse prevents the copyright owner from asserting 
infringement and asking for damages when the infringement occurred by his derelic-
tion of duty.”).  The principle has seen limited applicability, however, because the 
agency’s duty of disclosure sprang not from the general obligations of copyright but 
from a consent decree previously entered against the agency.  Tempo Music, 407 F.2d 
at 506-07; 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 13.09[B] n.147.  Contract law 
might nonetheless provide the grounds for imposing heightened disclosure require-
ments on any licensor who sought to enforce idiosyncratic terms in copyright.  See 
infra Parts IV-V. 
 137. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 64, at 178-80 (explaining that sometimes firms offer special 
benefits only to those who read, ensuring that non-readers receive no benefits from 
the activities of the informed minority). 
 138. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Com-
petitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006). 
 139. Id. at 830. 
 140. Id. at 834. 
 141. Id. at 835 (“With infrequent sales or poor information about sellers, sellers 
will not be constrained by reputational concerns.”). 
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market for copyrighted works includes many who lack the same reputational 
interests. 
“Copyright trolls” represent one category of entities indifferent to their 
reputations.  While scholars offer competing definitions for trolling, these 
definitions cluster around the idea of enforcing a copyright not to deter in-
fringement or to secure the commercial value of the work, but instead to prof-
it from litigation revenues.142  These entities are often not themselves authors 
but rather litigation operations with strong short-term interests in the profits 
of infringement actions and with little to no interest in their reputations as 
creators.143  While many trolls thus far have directed their attention towards 
consumers who have allegedly engaged in illegal downloading, an enterpris-
ing outfit might collect breach of license claims to use as a cheap hook for 
infringement suits.144 
Copyright owners also pursue infringement litigation with relative repu-
tational impunity by suing third-party services for their vicarious role in facil-
itating infringement rather than suing their customers directly.  This is why 
Nintendo sued Galoob for the alleged infringement facilitated by the “Game 
Genie” – a device that allowed home users to cheat at Nintendo’s copyrighted 
videogames – rather than its own customers.145  The same strategy percolated 
through the file-sharing litigation of the early 2000s, when the recording in-
dustry sued website owners rather than individual downloaders.146  MDY v. 
Blizzard – one of few cases to directly confront the availability of copyright 
 
 142. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 
S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 767 (2013) (“Having no interest in the use or exploitation of the 
work and dependent entirely on settlements and damages for its revenue, a copyright 
troll is almost never satisfied with an order merely enjoining the defendant’s infring-
ing activities.”); Brad. A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 59-60 (2014) (identifying trolls as parties who acquire a 
copyright “with an eye to the litigation value of the work, not the commercial value”); 
Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study at 1 (SSRN Elec. Library, 
Working Paper No. 2,404,950, July 3, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2404950 (forthcoming IOWA L. REV. (2015)) (defining 
trolls as parties who file infringement suits “to turn litigation into an independent 
revenue stream”). 
 143. See Balganesh, supra note 142, at 767 (arguing the problem with copyright 
trolls is that they disrupt the balance between “actionable and enforced” claims and 
“actionable but tolerated” claims); Greenberg, supra note 142, at 59-60. 
 144. Cf. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 62 (“[C]ommercially valueless copyrights 
are ubiquitous; they are much more cheaply available than bad patents . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 145. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 146. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000).  These 
cases are distinct from the recording industry’s subsequent suits against individuals. 
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damages for breach of license terms – is itself a manifestation of this strate-
gy.147 
As noted in the introduction, MDY is about control over gameplay in 
Blizzard’s wildly popular online game, World of Warcraft (“WoW”).148  
Blizzard complained that a third party created “bots” – software that auto-
mates gameplay in ways that give bot-users an advantage over other play-
ers.149  This concern was not arbitrary: the evidence suggests that many play-
ers disapproved of bots and that Blizzard risked losing customers if it could 
not contain what its players perceived as cheating.150  To curb the behavior, 
Blizzard licensed the game on terms that prohibited “cheats, bots, ‘mods,’ 
and/or hacks, or any other third-party software designed to modify the World 
of Warcraft experience.”151 
Notwithstanding the prohibition, 120,000 of Blizzard’s customers pur-
chased MDY’s “Glider” bot to automate their own gameplay.152  Blizzard 
argued that its restriction on third-party software was a condition of its li-
cense, and that any customer who breached this term was therefore a copy-
right infringer.153  If Blizzard prevailed in this argument, then it could have 
sued each and every one of the 120,000 customers who used Glider, claiming 
copyright infringement.154  Rather than alienate its paying customers, howev-
er, Blizzard sued MDY on the theory that it was vicariously liable for these 
tens of thousands of infringing acts.155  (The Ninth Circuit ultimately held 
that Blizzard could not enforce these terms as conditions, but its reasoning 
leaves much to be desired.)156 
Given the range of enforcement strategies that different copyright hold-
ers have adopted, it is no answer to say that reputational constraints will con-
trol abuse of license conditions.  Rather, a satisfactory answer must account 
for opportunistic licensors and for secondary liability suits like Blizzard’s 
action against MDY.157 
 
 147. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 148. Id. at 934-35. 
 149. Id. at 935-36. 
 150. See id. at 36 (“Blizzard claims that . . . it received 465,000 complaints about 
WoW bots, several thousand of which named Glider.”). 
 151. Id. at 938. 
 152. Id. at 936. 
 153. See id. at 937-38. 
 154. Multiplying the statutory minimum of $200 across this number of infringers 
would result in $24 million in liability.  And that figure assumes innocent infringe-
ment.  Substituting in the more likely non-innocent minimum damages of $750 would 
yield damages of at least $90 million.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2) (2012); see also 
supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
 155. See MDY, 629 F.3d at 937-38. 
 156. See infra Section III.A. 
 157. The question of when a party ought to be liable for contributory or vicarious 
liability is complicated by the fact that a third party like MDY might be better situated 
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* * * 
Copyright’s traditional protections provide limited relief against sub-
stantively problematic conditions.  They provide even less aid when the li-
censing defect is a failure of notice.  To be sure, there are several ways that 
the Copyright Act could be bolstered to overcome these limitations.  Con-
gress might reform statutory damages to impose a different liability scale in 
consumer cases, expand judicial discretion to waive damages in cases of un-
witting license breach, or do away with statutory damages altogether.  Con-
gress – or the Supreme Court – might redirect the preemption and misuse 
defenses to confront defective notice in licensing.  Or Section 117 might 
simply be expanded to protect routine private uses of a digital work whether 
it was licensed or owned.  In the absence of top-down reform, however, 
courts and commentators have sought to cabin abusive license practices by 
developing new substantive limits for adoption in the courts.  The next Part 
considers these proposals. 
III.  SUBSTANTIVE REFORM PROPOSALS 
Contemporary debate regarding license conditions focuses on whether 
there ought to be substantive limits on the terms enforceable in copyright.  As 
it stands, those who advocate substantive limits are at an impasse with those 
who would discard substantive limits in favor of notice and disclosure strate-
gies. 
Those who advance substantive limits argue that novel or idiosyncratic 
conditions are problematic where they impose externalities that undermine 
copyright’s goals.158  To the extent these terms would continue to pose exter-
nalities even if licensees understood their agreements, they present a classic 
market failure that invites substantive intervention.  But to extend these sub-
stantive limits beyond this limited set of market failures risks unnecessarily 
frustrating socially beneficial license arrangements.159  Drawn carelessly – as 
in MDY – these limits could jeopardize the enforcement of the licenses de-
ployed by the free culture and free software movements, along with the edu-
cational-use licenses released by many proprietary software developers.160  
Even a more careful substantive intervention – one that preserved today’s 
innovative licenses – might ossify current licensing practices without leaving 
 
to understand the terms of the license than the licensees themselves.  The discussion 
of this issue continues below at Section V.D. 
 158. See Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1082.  Section III.B, infra, provides a 
more detailed exposition of the substantive approach. 
 159. See, e.g., Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1232 (arguing “it is hard to identify any 
concerns” where licensees understand the terms). 
 160. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 128 (“Many purported license 
conditions in [Free and Open Source Software] licenses would not be classified as 
such under the MDY approach, even though . . . they are fundamental to open source 
licensing.”). 
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room for further development.  This approach is also underinclusive: it does 
nothing to guard against overreaching terms that are substantively non-
objectionable yet poorly disclosed. 
Those who would reject substantive limits present the opposite con-
cerns: their approach leaves more room for license innovation but downplays 
the risk that some externalities might not be susceptible to correction through 
market mechanisms.161  There are also open questions as to whether the 
heightened disclosures that some of these scholars propose would actually 
discipline the use of boilerplate.  To the extent this approach relies on copy-
right law as the basis for inquiring into the sufficiency of notice, moreover, 
the doctrinal basis for the intervention is unclear.162  Against this background 
there is the risk that leaving regulation to contract law would simply give 
licensors a free hand.  The following discussion outlines these positions, be-
ginning with the substantive approach outlined in MDY. 
A.  The Ninth Circuit’s Nexus 
The Ninth Circuit inaugurated the discussion of substantive limits with 
its “nexus” test in MDY v. Blizzard.163  As noted above, the court squarely 
confronted the question of whether Blizzard could use copyright to enforce a 
prohibition on third-party cheat bots.164  The court agreed with Blizzard’s 
position in theory: it found that users merely licensed their copies and that 
playing the game therefore created the sort of RAM copies that would be 
infringing without a license.165  It was nonetheless troubled.  The court rea-
soned that, if it were to allow conditions like these, then: 
Blizzard – or any software copyright holder – could designate any dis-
favored conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by 
purporting to condition the license on the player’s abstention from the 
disfavored conduct. . . .  This would allow software copyright owners 
far greater rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright 
owners.166 
To avoid this result, the court held that, for a condition to be actionable 
in copyright, “there must be a nexus between the condition and the licensor’s 
exclusive rights of copyright.”167  (It would go on to recognize copyright lia-
bility for non-performance of conditions requiring payment of money, creat-
 
 161. Section III.C, infra, unpacks their arguments and the questions they have left 
open. 
 162. See generally supra Part II. 
 163. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 164. Id. at 939-40. 
 165. Id. at 939. 
 166. Id. at 941. 
 167. Id. 
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ing a sui generis exception.)168  It then held that the prohibition on bots failed 
this test, notwithstanding a plausible nexus between this prohibition and play-
ers’ making of RAM copies during gameplay.169  The nexus requirement has 
rhetorical flair, but it has drawn heavy criticism for providing little coherent 
guidance and for jeopardizing the enforcement of innovative license terms. 
1.  Unclear Guidance 
MDY offers no clear explanation for why restricting the RAM copying 
that occurs while running software does not satisfy its nexus test.  The opin-
ion recognizes that the user does in fact “copy WoW software” whenever she 
runs the game.170  Pursuant to the RAM copy doctrine, moreover, the court 
recognized that users may infringe if they create copies that do not fall within 
the scope of the license.171  This understanding of RAM copies indicates a 
plausible nexus between any condition restricting gameplay and Blizzard’s 
exclusive right to authorize copying of its software.172 
The court seems to be tacitly rejecting the RAM copy doctrine in this 
context and requiring that the restricted conduct infringe the copyright own-
er’s exclusive rights on its own.  In rejecting copyright liability, it curtly ex-
plained that “Glider does not infringe any of Blizzard’s exclusive rights,” as 
“the use does not alter or copy WoW software.”173  If this is the test, howev-
er, then the license condition does no work at all.  Consider the single term 
that the opinion identified as a valid condition – one that “forbids creation of 
derivative works based on WoW without Blizzard’s consent.”174  There is no 
denying that this term has a direct nexus to the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right to create derivative works: it completely duplicates it.175  By default, no 
one – licensee or not – has the right to make derivative works without Bliz-
zard’s permission (barring an exception like fair use).  So far as copyright 
liability is concerned, a license that was simply silent about any such permis-
sion would therefore be equivalent to one expressly forbidding derivative 
works.  At best, the term might give the licensee the option to sue in contract 
 
 168. Id. at 941 n.4. 
 169. Id. at 941 (explaining the broad reach of the RAM copy doctrine). 
 170. Id. at 939 (acknowledging that users may infringe when their computers 
“copy WoW software into RAM”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Other scholars also find the test just as puzzling.  Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, for example, notes: “[I]t is unclear why there was not a nexus in MDY, 
where the forbidden conduct itself – playing World of Warcraft with Glider – in-
volved making a copy of Blizzard’s copyrighted game on the user’s computer.”  Van 
Houweling, supra note 7, at 1083.  Michael Kenneally likewise asserts: “It is not clear 
how the license violation, in such circumstances, would lack a nexus with the owner’s 
exclusive right of reproduction.”  Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1224. 
 173. MDY, 629 F.3d at 941. 
 174. Id. at 940. 
 175. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
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as an alternative to suing for copyright infringement.176  A term so completely 
coextensive with the protections of copyright, however, ought to fail under 
the Ninth Circuit’s own preemption jurisprudence.177 
If the nexus test upheld only those conditions that overlapped with exist-
ing copyright protections, moreover, then it would impose a de facto ban on 
termination conditions.178  Michael Kenneally offers a keen articulation of 
this problem: 
Perhaps what the Ninth Circuit meant was that using a bot to play a 
computer game does not in and of itself infringe copyright in the way 
that making unauthorized derivative works does.  It would, however, 
be quite radical to suggest that license restrictions prohibiting actions 
that are not in and of themselves infringing could never act as condi-
tions.  Not only would such a rule make attribution conditions power-
less . . . but it would also foreclose the common practice of condition-
ing copyright licenses on payment.179 
The court seemed to recognize this problem in its concession that pay-
ment terms might survive as a sui generis category of conditions.180  Under 
this rule, Blizzard would be empowered to revoke its license for failure to pay 
a subscription fee – thereby subjecting non-payers who continued to use the 
software to infringement liability.181  It would be unable, however, to revoke 
its license for failure to comply with a prohibition on the use of third-party 
software like Glider.  The court’s opinion is unsatisfying in its failure to ex-
plain why (or even whether) payment is the single form of collateral consid-
eration that licensors are authorized to demand.182 
 
 176. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforc-
ing contractual terms that secured rights similar to those protected by copyright). 
 177. G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 
904 (9th Cir. 1992) (“17 U.S.C. § 301(a) prohibits state-law protection for any right 
equivalent to those in the Copyright Act.”); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at 
§ 1.01[B][1][a][iii]. 
 178. Recall that scope limitations define the ways in which the licensee can use 
the software without infringing; termination conditions describe obligations the licen-
see must fulfill to retain the license and often speak to matters like payment that are 
collateral to the actual use of the work.  See supra Section I.A. 
 179. Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1224-25. 
 180. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 181. See supra Section I.A (describing how termination conditions lay the founda-
tion for an infringement action for continued use past the point of termination). 
 182. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 130 (“Neither contract nor copyright 
policy justifies favoring monetary consideration over non-monetary consideration.”); 
Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1225 (“[I]t would seem important to identify a principled 
basis for distinguishing cash payments from these other forms of consideration.  Yet 
the court offered none.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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2.  Problems for License Innovation 
The problem with MDY’s nexus test runs deeper than doctrinal confu-
sion.  It also makes it difficult for licensors to enforce novel terms regardless 
of their potential benefits for consumers and copyright policy.  In framing this 
test, the MDY court ignored the key role that these terms – which often serve 
as alternatives to payment – play in advancing the creation and distribution of 
new works.  It also overlooked the importance of copyright liability in mak-
ing these terms viable. 
Consider the attribution requirement of the Creative Commons license 
and many other free licenses.  Authors use these licenses to release works to 
the public free of charge, asking only that users credit the original author 
whenever they redistribute or modify the work.  These exchanges advance 
copyright’s goals by providing both the incentives and the means to create: 
the reputational rewards motivate many creators, and open license terms al-
low subsequent creators to generate countless thousands of derivative 
works.183  Terms like these also facilitate the distribution of works by allow-
ing nonmonetary pricing.  Even if a user was unwilling or unable to pay mon-
ey to use a work, he might offer compensation in the form of attribution. 
The prohibitions on commercial use that are common for educational or 
demonstration versions of software serve a similar role.184  Proprietary soft-
 
 183. The Federal Circuit in Jacobsen v. Katzer waxed poetic on the impact of 
Creative Commons and similar public licenses: 
Open source licensing has become a widely used method of creative collabo-
ration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace 
that few could have imagined just a few decades ago.  For example, the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”) uses a Creative Commons public 
license for an OpenCourseWare project that licenses all 1800 MIT courses.  
Other public licenses support the GNU/Linux operating system, the Perl pro-
gramming language, the Apache web server programs, the Firefox web 
browser, and a collaborative web-based encyclopedia called Wikipedia.  Crea-
tive Commons notes that, by some estimates, there are close to 100,000,000 
works licensed under various Creative Commons licenses. 
535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 424-25 (2002) (arguing that 
“indirect appropriation” of benefits such as reputation is a powerful motivator for peer 
production). 
 184. See Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1206-11 (describing the potential benefits of 
price discrimination in software).  For a conventional example of discount software, 
see Autodesk Software for Students and Educators, supra note 38.  For a more unusu-
al example, consider WordWeb’s dictionary-thesaurus software.  Rather than offering 
a student discount, it provides a 30-day free trial to all comers and requires anyone 
who takes more than “two commercial flights . . . in any 12 month period” to pay for 
continued use after the 30 days.  WordWeb Free Version Licensing, WORDWEB, 
http://wordweb.info/free/licence5.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).  WordWeb’s ra-
tionale lies partly in market segmentation, providing free access for “relatively non-
wealthy people,” and partly from a desire to encourage people to reduce carbon emis-
sions.  Id.  A prior version also discriminated against non-disabled people who “own 
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ware creators share free versions of their work under these licenses in hopes 
that they will build awareness for their brand and attract purchases from those 
who are impressed with the demonstration version.  Users pay for these cop-
ies not with money, but with a promise not to use this copy except for educa-
tional or otherwise non-commercial purposes.  Flexibility in licensing allows 
copyright owners to experiment with product offerings and prices in ways 
that can increase the public’s access to and engagement with copyrighted 
works.185 
Neither set of terms would fare well, however, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
nexus test.  Attribution is not an exclusive right of copyright.186  To be sure, 
the creation and distribution of derivative works – with or without attribution 
– implicate the author’s exclusive rights.187  The author could therefore argue 
that the nexus is satisfied because attribution is something the licensee must 
do while exercising these rights.188  But there is little to distinguish this posi-
tion from Blizzard’s, whose prohibition on cheating was something the licen-
see had to observe while exercising Blizzard’s exclusive right to make RAM 
copies. 
If the attribution term were relegated to enforcement in contract, howev-
er, it would be toothless.189  What are the expectation damages for misuse of 
a work given away for free?190  There might be reputational damages for the 
 
or regularly drive an SUV.”  WordWeb 5.0 Free Version License, WORDWEB, 
http://wordweb.info/free/licence.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 185. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 21, at 223-24 (“Empowering authors to 
experiment with a variety of arrangements is, in my view, much more likely to enrich 
our expressive culture than to impoverish it.”).  Terms like these can also be under-
stood as promoting access by facilitating market segmentation among customers will-
ing to pay for the full version and those willing to settle for a restricted version.  See 
William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1203, 1239 (1998) (“[P]rice discrimination leads to substantial improvements in dis-
tributive justice – better approximation of the ideal of affording all persons access to 
works of the intellect.”); Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 741, 772-73 (2015) (arguing that market segmentation provides a cheap tool to 
incentivize creation while also promoting access by allowing authors to expand their 
markets).  But see Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra note 16, at 286-89 (2013) 
(questioning the net social utility of restrictions like these). 
 186. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 129 n.117. 
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)-(3) (2012). 
 188. These terms are often described, moreover, not so much as use restrictions, 
but as the consideration paid for the license.  See, e.g., Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1379 
(describing the “choice to exact consideration in the form of compliance with the 
open source requirements”); Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1225.  Viewed as considera-
tion, however, these terms would almost certainly fail under MDY because they are 
not payment terms.  See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 131. 
 189. See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382 (“[T]hese types of license restrictions might 
well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.”). 
 190. The fact that the breaching party profited would be irrelevant.  Contract typi-
cally worries itself only with the licensor’s loss and not with the licensee’s unjust 
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lost chance to gain recognition, but these would be difficult to quantify and 
seldom worth suing for.191  What the author really wants in a case like this is 
not money – particularly where she gives the work away for free – but an 
injunction requiring the offender to either provide proper attribution or cease 
the infringing use.192  This too is easier to win in copyright than specific per-
formance would be in contract.193  Without copyright’s fee-shifting opportu-
nities,194 moreover, it would be hard to justify the expense of a suit with so 
little in the way of damages. 
Non-commerciality provisions would also fare poorly under MDY’s test.  
Consider what little difference there is between a software restriction that 
prohibits cheating and one prohibiting commercial uses, both of which target 
a specific form of RAM copying.  One might try to save the non-commercial 
use terms by reference to the Ninth Circuit’s sui generis exception for pay-
ment terms.  Because the licensor often offers an unrestricted version in ex-
change for monetary payment, it might argue that the restriction is essentially 
a payment term that ought to be enforceable in copyright.  This answer is not 
satisfying, however, because by the same logic Blizzard could enforce an 
anti-cheating provision – or really any provision – so long as it charged a 
higher price for an alternative license without that provision.  Under this rea-
soning, non-commerciality terms might be enforceable for commercial soft-
ware developers (given that they typically sell higher-priced versions without 
the restriction), but ironically not for Creative Commons licensors (who often 
release their works subject to a non-commerciality restriction without selling 
an unrestricted version).  It is counterintuitive that a term would be more en-
forceable merely because the licensor was willing to put a price on its waiv-
er.195 
 
gains, making copyright the stronger deterrent.  See Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for 
Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (2011). 
 191. See McGowan, supra note 21, at 213 (“Violations of those terms can cause 
harm that is either hard to count in dollar terms or for which authors would not count 
money as adequate payment.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 116 (“Injunctive relief is a particu-
larly critical remedy because the standard remedy for breach of contract, monetary 
damages, normally is beside the point in FOSS licensing.” (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
 193. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Con-
tracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX.  INTELL.  PROP.  L.J. 335, 341 
(2009) (“[I]njunctive relief is common for copyright infringement but granted rarely 
for breach of contract.”). 
 194. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 195. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 190, at 28 (endorsing firms’ choice not to assign 
liquidated damages clauses to particularly undesirable forms of breach because they 
want to eliminate the behavior rather than price it).  But see Yafit Lev-Aretz, Recon-
ciling Original With Secondary Creation: The Subtle Incentive Theory of Copyright 
Licensing (Feb. 2014) (unpublished working paper), available at http://works.bepress.
39
Ard: Ard: Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
352 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Enforcing non-commerciality provisions like these would be a losing 
proposition in contract.  Even setting aside statutory damages, copyright of-
fers an elegant remedy in disgorgement of profits.196  Disgorgement opera-
tionalizes the non-commercial term by depriving the licensee of any profits 
from unauthorized use.  Contract, however, is limited in focus to the licen-
sor’s loss.197  At best, the licensor could argue that it was cheated out of the 
purchase price for the full version of its software, and it might recover the 
difference.  Even software that retailed for $1,000 could hardly justify the 
expense of the lawsuit.  The licensee, moreover, would have little incentive to 
pay the full purchase price at the outset.  Limiting enforcement to contract 
remedies would give the opportunistic licensee the option to simply pay later 
and even then only if she were caught.  As to these opportunists, punitive 
damages could play a salutary role. 
B.  Alternative Substantive Reforms 
Few would defend MDY’s nexus.  But some scholars seek to articulate 
an alternative substantive nexus that would be better tailored to copyright’s 
goals and the high information costs of licenses.  Identifying the right stand-
ards, however, is difficult.  Even rules that accommodated today’s free cul-
ture and free software licenses might prove stifling to future license innova-
tion.  And even the most judicious substantive intervention might not speak to 
failures of notice. 
1.  The Purposive Nexus 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling offers a purposive nexus: “a copyright li-
cense condition that purports to impose a running restriction on use of a copy 
of a copyrighted work [would be] enforceable only where its enforcement 
would promote the purposes of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights.”198  
This approach – almost by definition – would yield the right level of en-
forcement.  It is nonetheless indeterminate in practice given that it requires a 
court not only to discern copyright’s goals, but also to conduct case-by-case 
analysis to determine whether particular terms are consistent with those 
goals.199  The difficulty in applying this approach is apparent in evaluating 
the anti-bot provision in MDY: Van Houweling finds the nexus question “a 
closer one” because “use of Glider may degrade the game experience for oth-
 
com/yafit_lev-aretz/2/ (arguing that a firm’s refusal to license a given use strengthens 
an infringer’s claim to fair use). 
 196. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012). 
 197. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 190, at 9-10. 
 198. Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1083 (emphasis added). 
 199. See id. at 1085 (recognizing that the goal of promoting progress has no 
“clearly agreed upon meaning”). 
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er users in a way that has a nexus with the progress-promoting purposes of 
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.”200 
One advantage of this approach is that it could police against the kinds 
of market failures that occur when a licensor tries to draw termination condi-
tions that interfere with fair use.201  Van Houweling explains this risk in the 
context of a license condition prohibiting criticism of the work.202  Negative 
reviews are a classic fair use in part because of the tremendous social benefits 
they generate: they advance public discussion of the work while simultane-
ously revealing the quality of the work to other would-be purchasers.203 
Market failure might occur, however, because the benefit to any indi-
vidual consumer in retaining the right to criticize a work is low.  Most people 
do not fancy themselves reviewers.  Indeed, a user will not know that a prod-
uct deserves a bad review until after purchasing it and discovering its de-
fects.204  Consumers – even perfectly informed consumers – might according-
ly trade these rights away without regard for the de minimis individual bene-
fit.205  Cumulatively, however, these decisions would create undesirable ex-
ternalities because “society bears the ill-effects of staying uninformed about 
the bugs and shortcomings of muzzled products.”206  Van Houweling notes 
“that progress would be undermined, not promoted, by deploying copyright 
to protect copyright owners from critique.”207  It therefore stands to reason 
that copyright should substantively bar terms like these. 
The set of terms where one might conclude ex ante that the harms to 
copyright policy outweigh the benefits is nonetheless small.  Indeed, setting 
aside restrictions on fair use, it would seem that most license terms have the 
potential to advance the objectives of copyright by facilitating the creation 
and distribution of new works.208  Copyright owners presumably demand 
particular terms because they find them valuable.  Compliance with these 
 
 200. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added). 
 201. The classic justification for fair use, after all, is that the doctrine is meant to 
guard against market failure in the market for use of creative works.  See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
 202. Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 948.  In a later piece, Van Houweling 
develops a similar argument regarding the defects in the converse term requiring that 
the user write favorable reviews.  Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1084. 
 203. Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 948. 
 204. See Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1206 (“[T]he creative insight to lampoon 
some piece of software may arrive only after first-hand experience of how dreadful it 
is.”). 
 205. Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 948. 
 206. Id.  A term like this might result in market failure not only because of the 
externalities posed when well-informed actors rationally undervalue their individual 
rights to criticize the work, but also because of boundedly rational actors’ systematic 
discounting of the costs imposed by these terms.  See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 207. Van Houweling, supra note 7, at 1082. 
 208. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
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terms may provide the non-monetary compensation that spurs the owner to 
create and release the work, thereby advancing copyright’s interests in crea-
tion and distribution.209  Non-monetary prices likewise have the potential to 
promote access by allowing users to “pay” for a work even where their dis-
cretionary income is limited.  The real danger for many idiosyncratic terms 
lies not in their substantive effect on copyright policy, but in their potential to 
catch users unaware or chill lawful engagement with creative works.210 
2.  Standardization 
Some scholars view substantive standardization as the answer to the 
high information costs posed by licensing.  These scholars follow the view 
that Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith developed in property law, in which 
standardization is meant to prohibit idiosyncratic property arrangements that 
impose information externalities on the public.211  Notwithstanding the con-
cern that property rhetoric is sometimes used to justify the expansion of intel-
lectual property in rent-seeking ways, these scholars show how common law 
property principles can be mobilized to serve public ends.212 
Van Houweling argues that greater standardization would combat terms 
that impose high information externalities.213  Her approach gives leeway to 
 
 209. Cf. Rub, supra note 185, at 27-28 (explaining how copyright holders’ flexi-
bility to tailor their prices to what people are willing to pay can improve their incen-
tives). 
 210. See supra Subsection I.B.3. 
 211. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 79, at 26-27 (“The need for standardization 
in property law stems from an externality involving measurement costs: Parties who 
create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the meas-
urement costs they impose on strangers to the title.”).  To be sure, licenses are con-
ventionally understood as contracts rather than as a category of property.  Scholars 
like Van Houweling nonetheless reason from property principles because licenses 
often embody the core characteristic of servitudes as understood in property law: 
“they run with the assets to which they attach and bind remote owners of those as-
sets.”  Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 890.  Other scholars draw the connection 
more directly.  Mulligan, for example, brings attention to IP-embedded goods that are 
themselves chattels, keying into property law’s undisputed application to physical 
objects.  See generally Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 16.  And 
Christopher Newman – though he is not predisposed towards substantive limits for 
license terms – argues that the “concept of license . . . belongs fundamentally to prop-
erty, not contract,” thereby inviting the application of common law property princi-
ples.  Newman, supra note 24, at 1109. 
 212. David Fagundes’ recent work explores the complicated role that property 
rhetoric plays in intellectual property law, contrasting a maximalist approach to intel-
lectual property rooted in the discourse of property ownership with an alternative 
conception of property as a system of social relations meant to advance the common 
good.  See generally David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 652 (2010). 
 213. See Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 897-98. 
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terms that merely supplant the already high information costs provided by 
background copyright law.214  As she notes, the Copyright Act already im-
poses high information costs on uses of copyrighted works that implicate the 
exclusive rights set forth at Section 106.215  The person who has physical 
possession of a photograph, for example, knows (or ought to know) in light of 
the Copyright Act that she cannot reproduce the work, publicly distribute it, 
or create her own adaptations; terms that regulate these uses therefore add 
few new costs.216  To undertake these uses would require intensive investiga-
tion to identify the copyright owner followed by the transaction costs of ne-
gotiating for the necessary permissions.217  If the same photo were released 
under a Creative Commons license that allowed for reproduction, distribu-
tion, or adaptation subject to an attribution requirement, the licensor would 
not “complicate an otherwise simple situation.”218  Indeed, the permissions 
granted by the publicly available license would probably reduce the licensee’s 
transaction costs relative to a world where the user had to locate and negotiate 
with the copyright owner. 
Van Houweling contrasts the Creative Commons’ terms with a condi-
tion restricting mere use of software.219  A term like this, in her view, “ex-
ceed[s] the baseline restrictiveness of copyright” because “use per se is not an 
exclusive right of the copyright holder.”220  The baseline restrictiveness of 
copyright for the use of digital works is complicated, however, by whatever 
information costs and restrictions the RAM copy doctrine imposes.221  We 
might nonetheless accept the point in modified form by focusing not on the 
formal obligations of copyright, but rather the “ingrained expectations” of 
consumers.222  Consumers may understand that the works they acquire – re-
gardless of how much or how little they cost – typically carry well-known 
copyright restrictions that disallow copying for friends, remixing, or re-
distributing the work via a file-sharing site.  But they would likely be sur-
prised to find restrictions that applied to their routine personal use of the 
work.  Van Houweling’s analysis therefore suggests a ban on terms that en-
cumber these uses. 
Christina Mulligan argues even more emphatically for standardization.  
She explores in detail the information costs posed by idiosyncratic terms as 
well as the real economic costs “from [licensees’] underuse of property and 
 
 214. See id. at 936 n.282. 
 215. Id. at 935. 
 216. Id. at 936. 
 217. See id. at 937. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 938. 
 220. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221. Cf. Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1202-03 (taking the position that any argu-
ment against use restrictions “has to be independent of copyright law’s baseline on 
pain of circularity: it is precisely that baseline that is in dispute in such cases”). 
 222. See Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 935. 
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[licensors’] overinvestment in fences, respectively.”223  She also explains that 
this confusion is only likely to become worse as more chattels become digit-
ized, exposing consumers to the risk that the mundane items they encounter 
will be burdened with idiosyncratic license restrictions owing to embedded 
software or firmware.224  To counter this uncertainty, Mulligan would effec-
tively do away with consumer use restrictions.  Specifically, she suggests re-
characterizing most consumer licensures as sales – restoring users’ freedom 
to make incidental RAM copies in the course of use – to “align rights in digi-
tal goods with existing consumer expectations in the physical objects all 
around them.”225 
Standardization is attractive insofar as it could eliminate much of the 
uncertainty associated with use restrictions.  Short of eliminating use re-
strictions entirely – establishing sale as the standard form for disposition of 
consumer copies – standard-setters could create a set menu of copyright-
enforceable terms.226  Perhaps attribution terms and commerciality prohibi-
tions would be approved, but restraints on cheating at a videogame would 
not.  Standardization nonetheless raises at least three difficulties. 
The first difficulty with standardization is that it imposes costs by pre-
venting socially beneficial transactions.  These costs encompass the frustra-
tion of parties’ interests when they are unable to structure an individual trans-
action in the way they would prefer.227  Frustration costs can also accrue to 
the detriment of copyright policy.  To the extent that novel licensing forms 
would encourage more creation and sharing of works, prohibiting these li-
censes impedes progress. 
The second difficulty lies in establishing an effective process for sepa-
rating good terms from bad.  Perhaps the legislature or an administrative 
agency would be equipped to devise a menu of terms that actually advance 
the policy goals of copyright, or to balance increased information costs 
against the social benefits of a given term.228  But this is not the sort of task 
courts are suited for.  The necessary economic analysis exceeds the courts’ 
expertise and puts them in the uncomfortable position of making policy 
judgments on complex, unsettled issues.229  Without greater consensus on the 
policy objectives of copyright or better data on the actual impact of novel 
 
 223. Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra note 16, at 265. 
 224. See Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 16, at 32-34. 
 225. Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra note 16, at 276. 
 226. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 975, 983 (2005) (proposing that an agency generate a white list of pre-
approved terms for consumer contracts). 
 227. Merrill & Smith, supra note 79, at 30; Mulligan, Numerus Clausus, supra 
note 16, at 286 (“[I]mposition of a numerus clausus principle onto intellectual proper-
ty law would create frustration costs.  The important question is whether those costs 
are outweighed by the benefits.”). 
 228. See Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1204.  But see id. at 1204-05 (expressing 
doubt that there is political will for Congress to intervene). 
 229. See id. at 1204. 
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licensing forms, moreover, the courts could inadvertently thwart socially ben-
eficial innovations in licensing.  The MDY opinion is the case in point for 
how judicial standardization could misfire. 
Finally, substantive interventions may simply fail to reach the problem 
of consumer ignorance.  Take a common term like an educational-use only 
clause.  A policymaker might decide that this term is substantively appropri-
ate as a matter of copyright policy because it promotes widespread access to 
works.  Policymakers might likewise approve of attribution requirements, 
limits on transfer, or monthly subscription frees.  Consumers would nonethe-
less face unreasonable information costs – and the risk of unwitting infringe-
ment – if licensors were permitted to impose and enforce these restrictions 
merely by inserting them in the fine print of lengthy user agreements.  Proce-
dural protections are necessary – at least as complements – to any project of 
substantive standardization. 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman articulate an alternative ap-
proach to information costs in property law.230  They argue that “[t]he law’s 
limitations on property rights take the form not of standardization into a dis-
creet [sic] number of well-defined forms, but rather of regulation of the types 
and degree of notice required to establish different types of property 
rights.”231  On this view, the law would allow idiosyncratic terms so long as 
parties successfully internalized their information costs.  The next Section 
explores the scholarship that has taken this more notice-oriented approach to 
the problem; the following Part will develop the argument further by ground-
ing this procedural approach in the normative and doctrinal commitments of 
contract. 
C.  The Laissez Faire Approach 
The Ninth Circuit’s flawed nexus test has fueled a wave of scholarship 
rejecting hard substantive limits on the designation of license conditions.232  
Under these approaches, satisfaction of a “nexus” test might be just one of 
several routes for validating a condition.  This Article builds on this more 
 
 230. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifi-
cation: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 373 (2002). 
 231. Id. at 374. 
 232. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 193, at 358-59 (arguing that “allowing 
the parties to freely choose [conditions] seems best” for innovation, and that tradi-
tional contract, copyright, and antitrust principles would check against overreaching); 
Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1232 (arguing that, where licensees have “very clear and 
salient notice of the conditions . . . it is hard to identify any concerns over the new 
property rules – either from society’s perspective or from that of the licensee who 
knowingly consented to them”); Newman, supra note 24, at 1154 (“There is . . . little 
need to place substantive restrictions on the sorts of terms that can validly serve as 
conditions.”). 
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open-ended approach by identifying the new questions it raises and seeking to 
answer them. 
Robert Gomulkiewicz argues that innovation in licensing is best ad-
vanced by allowing parties to freely designate conditions subject to the tradi-
tional limits of contract, copyright, and antitrust.233  He also pushes back 
against the “either/or” nature of the condition versus covenant question, find-
ing the implications too stark.234  He would set that question to the side and 
conduct a multifactor analysis at the remedial stage to determine whether to 
award injunctive relief for copyright infringement: adhesive consumer license 
terms that lacked a clear copyright nexus, involved only RAM copying, and 
had a tenuous connection to copyright policy would fare poorly under his 
test.235  So far as Gomulkiewicz is concerned with injunctive relief, his ap-
proach works because courts retain discretion to decide whether to issue an 
injunction even after finding infringement.236  But the award of statutory 
damages upon a finding of infringement is mandatory.237  The either/or ques-
tion of condition versus covenant, infringement versus breach of contract, 
therefore requires an answer. 
Christopher Newman emphasizes the importance of allowing parties to 
structure their agreements as they see fit, and accordingly would respect the 
parties’ choice to designate any terms they liked as enforceable in copy-
right.238  He would not rule out a substantive nexus per se, but he would insist 
on keeping any such substantive restrictions separate from the interpretive 
rules that delineate conditions and covenants so as to avoid making license 
interpretation unpredictable.239  The autonomy and efficiency he seeks to 
promote by respecting the parties’ agreements, however, assumes a system 
where the agreement as enforced actually matches the parties’ understand-
ings.240  In low-value transactions where information costs are high, it may be 
that we need interpretive rules that go beyond the agreement as written, not-
withstanding the added uncertainty, to ensure that unsophisticated parties 
receive the reasonably anticipated benefits of their licenses. 
 
 233. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 193, at 358-59. 
 234. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 132. 
 235. See id. at 134-35. 
 236. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 392-93 (2006) (“[T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace 
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically fol-
lows a determination that copyright has been infringed.”). 
 237. To be sure, courts could consider Gomulkiewicz’s factors in deciding wheth-
er to award only the mandatory minimum damages of $750 rather than the statutory 
maximum.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012).  But these factors could not support a 
reduction of damages to zero.  See supra Section II.A. 
 238. Newman, supra note 24, at 1154 n.231. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. at 1111 (describing goals for private ordering including the protection 
of autonomy, avoidance of conflict, and maximization of value through exchange). 
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Michael Kenneally takes up the boilerplate problem more directly in ar-
guing that courts should attend to whether the user had fair notice that a re-
striction would be enforceable on pain of copyright’s heightened remedies.241  
As he notes, this move could correct against licensors’ opportunism, vindi-
cate users’ reasonable expectations, and leave room for socially beneficial 
licenses to invoke copyright remedies.242  The legal basis for adopting this 
test, however, requires fuller articulation.  As noted above, copyright itself 
affords little discretion to avoid infringement on the basis of notice defects.243  
Kenneally invites the courts to introduce new principles into copyright law 
that would afford them greater remedial discretion.244  Such a development 
might be salutary against the backdrop of a copyright regime that – on the 
books and in practice – is often indifferent to the equities.  But it is unclear 
that the courts would be willing to adopt copyright doctrines that conflicted 
with the mandatory statutory damages expressly provided by the Copyright 
Act. 
I argue that contract law provides the foundation for enhanced scrutiny 
of license conditions.  The next Part shows that contract law provides the 
normative and doctrinal tools to protect the public from opportunism while 
leaving room for license innovation.  Critics might worry that the increasing 
contractualization of copyright law is problematic because it gives licensors 
seemingly unchecked power to claim new rights.  Indeed, this concern may 
explain scholars’ motivation to apply property principles rather than contract 
law to the regulation of licenses, a move that allows them to invoke the pub-
lic-regarding limitations associated with property law.245  Missing from this 
discussion is a comparable account of the public-regarding limitations of 
contract.  Whatever its problems, the contractualization of copyright should 
not be dismissed as offering unfettered power to licensors. 
 
 241. Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1230. 
 242. See id. at 1230-32. 
 243. See supra Part II; see also supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining that courts have discretion to refuse injunctive relief but not damages after 
infringement).  Kenneally looks for authority in support of remedial discretion in 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., a case in which the Federal Circuit upheld a 
trial court’s “discretion to limit duplicative damages where infringement coincides 
with contract breach.”  Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1230 (citing 320 F.3d 1317, 1327-
28 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  Bowers, however, is a case where the jury had awarded $2 mil-
lion in copyright and $4 million in contract for lost profits on copyrighted software.  
See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 185, 186-87 (D. Mass. 2000), 
aff’d, 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The trial court awarded only the higher figure, 
reasoning that to award both would allow the plaintiff to recover twice for each lost 
sale.  Id. at 187.  Bowers’ reasoning would be of little use to the defendant facing 
statutory damages, even if actual damages were trivial. 
 244. Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1243. 
 245. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text; see also Margaret Jane Ra-
din, Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State with 
the “Law” of the Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH.  J. 173, 185 (2004) (“When contract 
becomes property, then the public limitations on property should become relevant.”). 
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IV.  PROPORTIONALITY AND NOTICE IN CONTRACT 
The typical contract is enforced on pain of compensatory damages: the 
breaching party must pay for actual damages caused by breach.  Pursuant to 
doctrines like foreseeability, even actual damages are recoverable only up to 
the amount that the breaching party could reasonably anticipate.  And con-
tract law has historically frowned on parties’ attempts to specify alternate 
remedies.  This skepticism extends even to parties’ express designation of 
conditions as grounds for terminating the agreement, though courts enforce 
these restrictions where they are satisfied that the breaching party understood 
its obligation. 
Some might object that judicial refusal to enforce contracts as written 
interferes with parties’ freedom of contract.  But oftentimes these interven-
tions enhance the parties’ autonomy and the efficiency of the transaction – 
core concerns of contract – better than enforcing the letter of the agreement.  
This is particularly true where the transaction involves unsophisticated parties 
or is otherwise characterized by asymmetric information.  The following dis-
cussion explores these features of contract law in detail, with a particular 
focus on the normative concerns that animate contract law’s treatment of 
conditions.  Because copyright enforcement of consumer licenses would im-
pose highly supracompensatory damages in low-value transactions, contract 
law ought only to recognize copyright-enforceable terms where the licensor 
provides unequivocal notice of this risk.246 
A.  Proportionality in Damages 
Contract law’s compensatory damages are designed to put a party who 
suffers breach “in as good a position as he would have been had the contract 
been performed.”247  This remedial scheme seeks proportionality between the 
remedy and actual damages.248  Parties might prefer to attach supracompensa-
tory liability to particular terms – for example, through a clause providing 
 
 246. One contract doctrine absent from the following discussion is unconsciona-
bility.  To be sure, the notice concerns that animate this Article and the procedural 
dimension of unconscionability are analogous.  Unlike standard unconscionability 
doctrine, however, this Article is not concerned with whether a term is enforceable in 
contract, but rather with whether copyright liability should be available in the event of 
breach.  Cf. M.N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability of Remedy, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1988). 
 247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981). 
 248. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 38 
(2009) (arguing that “proportionality analysis” suffuses contract law’s “concern for 
fairness, expressed as freedom to contract and honoring a person’s reasonable expec-
tations”). 
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high liquidated damages – to increase the likelihood of compliance.249  But 
courts refuse to award liquidated damages that exceed a reasonable estimate 
of the loss, regardless of the parties’ wishes.250  Indeed, it is the parties’ intent 
“to coerce or secure performance” rather than to secure compensation that is 
damning.251 
This limitation on remedies can be defended as beneficial for both effi-
ciency and autonomy.  It allows “efficient breach,” so that a party may elect 
to breach when contractual performance would be more costly than simply 
paying compensatory damages for nonperformance.252  It also enhances con-
tractual autonomy insofar as it increases the likelihood that parties grasp their 
obligations: parties ought to understand intuitively that they are liable for the 
actual harms caused by their breach even if they do not or cannot understand 
the fine print.253  The limitation also advances a sort of fairness that might be 
called freedom from contract: a party is free to walk away from an obligation 
so long as she compensates the other party for its loss,254 and in any case a 
 
 249. But see Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promises Prefer Supracompensatory 
Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369 
(1990) (questioning this assumption). 
 250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981); see id. § 356 cmt. a 
(“The central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not 
punitive.”). 
 251. 24 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2012) (col-
lecting cases). 
 252. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and 
Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obliga-
tions should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after 
placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had perfor-
mance been rendered.”). 
 253. Contemporary work exploring consumers’ deficient understanding of mass-
market licenses also underscores how this limit on damages might enhance transac-
tional autonomy.  See generally supra Section I.B. 
  Many scholars question the wisdom of these limits on contractual freedom 
for agreements between sophisticated parties, who might contract for liquidated dam-
ages for perfectly legitimate reasons and with little room for misunderstanding.  See, 
e.g., Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just 
Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 592 
(1977) (“Liquidated damage provisions should be enforced in all cases unless evi-
dence of information barriers or reduced competitive opportunities rebuts the pre-
sumption of fair exchange.”); Schwartz, supra note 249, at 406-07 (“[P]arties will 
choose appropriate remedies when left to their own devices.”).  It does not follow, 
however, that liquidated damages ought to be allowed in transactions involving unso-
phisticated parties. 
 254. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 249, at 369 (explaining that the remedial scheme 
allows a promisor to “purchase her freedom”). 
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compensatory system protects consumers from oppressive penalties in the 
event of default.255 
B.  Expectations and Disclosure 
In addition to limiting recovery to actual damages, contract law limits 
recovery to those damages that would ordinarily be expected to flow from 
breach.256  To be sure, a party can contract to recover damages that are out of 
the ordinary.  But to do so the party must put the other party on notice that 
breach would be more costly than expected.257 
This emphasis on the parties’ expectations is evident in the foreseeabil-
ity rule articulated over 160 years ago in Hadley v. Baxendale.258  As most 
law students could tell you, Hadley’s mill became inoperable because its 
crankshaft broke.  He needed to deliver the broken part to a manufacturer so 
it could serve as the template for a replacement, so he contracted with Baxen-
dale’s company for shipment.  The part was supposed to arrive the next day, 
but it was delayed for a week “by some neglect” on Baxendale’s part.259  
Baxendale’s mistake rendered Hadley’s mill inoperable for an extra week, 
costing Hadley substantial profits.  These losses were actual damages result-
ing from breach.  The court nonetheless refused to award these lost profits, 
finding they were unforeseeable because Hadley had failed to explain at the 
time of shipment that delay would result in closure of his business. 
The leading justification for the rule is that it imposes efficient disclo-
sure obligations.260  Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain that the rule forces 
promisees who face higher than usual damages to identify themselves, allow-
ing promisors to take special precautions where the added liability justifies 
it.261  Because the promisee is typically in the best position to know its own 
risks, moreover, this rule is more efficient than one that would burden the 
promisor with investigating the cost of breach to each potential counterpar-
ty.262  The result is that parties have better information by which to prioritize 
their obligations or even to engage in efficient breach. 
 
 255. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 253, at 593-94 (explaining how this rule pro-
tected unsophisticated parties prior to the advent of contractual defenses like uncon-
scionability). 
 256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). 
 257. See id. § 351 cmt. b. 
 258. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (L.R. Exch.). 
 259. Id. 
 260. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 90; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & 
Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The 
Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J. L.  ECON. & ORGS. 284 (1991). 
 261. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 90, at 104 (“Hadley penalizes high-damage 
millers for withholding information that would allow carriers to take efficient precau-
tions.”). 
 262. Cf. id. at 103 (describing the large transaction costs involved in trying to 
discover each promisee’s expected damages); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 260, at 
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The foreseeability limit on liability likewise advances autonomy and 
fairness.263  A party’s lack of awareness as to a particular risk provides 
grounds to question whether that party actually intended to assume the risk as 
part of the bargain.264  If the party had understood the full scope of liability, 
she may have charged a higher price to cover her expense in taking additional 
precautions to avoid default, or she may have refused to enter the contract at 
all.265 
The reasonable expectations doctrine provides courts with another ave-
nue to prioritize parties’ expectations.  This doctrine, at least in its strongest 
form, entitles a party to the contractual rights she reasonably expected from 
the transaction “even though painstaking study of the . . . provisions would 
have negated those expectations.”266  It originated in the adjudication of in-
surance policies, an area dominated (much like copyright licenses) by dense 
terms that all consumers must face even though their prospects for reading 
the fine print – let alone understanding the nuances – are slim.267  The Second 
Restatement of Contracts seeks to extend the reasonable expectations test to 
contracts generally by way of Subsection 211(3), which voids any term where 
one party has reason to believe that the other is unaware of a term and would 
not have knowingly assented to it.268 
 
310-11 (explaining the savings in transaction costs that results when only high-
valuation buyers are required to communicate their expected damages).  But see id. at 
286 (recognizing that “communication costs” may sometimes be “higher than the 
benefits from differential precautions”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of 
Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563, 592-96 (1992) (arguing the rule is ineffi-
cient when the costs of processing and communicating information are high).  Like-
wise, the rule may fail where the relevant risk relates not to the potential magnitude of 
liability but its relative likelihood.  See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of 
Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999). 
 263. See Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 612 (arguing that Hadley’s foreseeability 
rule has survived “due in part to its ability to serve as a rough surrogate for the princi-
ple of fair disclosure”). 
 264. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1596 (2009). 
 265. See Eisenberg, supra note 262, at 587 (“[I]f a seller knows that a buyer will 
probably incur consequential damages, the seller might raise its price, take greater-
than-normal precaution . . . or both.”). 
 266. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provi-
sions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (articulating this principle in the insurance 
context). 
 267. See generally id.  For a particularly thorough exegesis of the doctrine’s role 
in regulating adhesive contracts, see Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
612 S.W.2d 413, 420-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).  Among the factors 
relevant to this determination are the bizarreness or oppression of the term, its poten-
tial to “eliminate[] the dominant purpose of the transaction,” and defects in its presen-
tation.  Id. at § 211 cmt. f. 
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Arizona state courts have taken the lead in applying the reasonable ex-
pectations test outside the insurance context, particularly to strike consumer 
arbitration clauses.269  Courts applying the test in this way often place great 
weight on consumers’ difficulty in understanding the practical effect of arbi-
tration and the magnitude of the due process rights waived.270  The test has 
been subject to considerable criticism – not least on the grounds that in prac-
tice courts often neglect the inquiry into consumers’ expectations to pursue 
their own notions of substantive fairness.271  But when properly directed to 
matters of notice it sits comfortably with the common law’s commitments to 
autonomy and efficiency.  Like the more venerable foreseeability doctrine, it 
is designed to improve assent by forcing the better-informed party to disclose 
unexpected consequences (or limitations) of the deal.  This arrangement not 
only lowers transaction costs – saving consumers the burden of trawling each 
contract for opportunistic clauses – but also makes it easier for parties to ap-
preciate the costs and benefits of the agreement and adjust their performance 
accordingly. 
C.  Presumption Against Conditions 
Parties who agree to a condition are specifying that the happening of 
some event will either create or extinguish a legal obligation.272  Much like a 
liquidated damages term, a condition gives rise to the risk that a party will 
pay a penalty that is disproportionately large relative to the breaching con-
duct.  The party who loses his entire insurance claim on account of filing it 
one day past the contractual deadline might complain that the twenty-four-
hour delay caused no actual harm.273  The party who had to surrender her 
home for violating a sale condition that prohibited smoking on the premises 
might likewise complain that her conduct simply caused no cognizable harm 
 
 269. Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, the inaugural case, struck the 
mandatory arbitration term in a patient’s agreement with a medical clinic as unex-
pected.  840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); see James J. White, Form Contracts Under Re-
vised Article 2, 75 WASH.  U. L.Q. 315, 335 (1997). 
 270. See, e.g., Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 152 (“Plaintiff was under a great deal of 
emotional stress, had only a high school education, was not experienced in commer-
cial matters, and is still not sure ‘what arbitration is.’”); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & 
Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002) (faulting defendant for failure to explain the arbitra-
tion clause, “a provision by which [the plaintiff] waived at least two constitutional 
rights, i.e., a right of access to the courts . . . and her right to a jury trial”). 
 271. See Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Stand-
ard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 
227, 249 (2007) (“Subsection 211(3) has not been expansively adopted by courts 
across the country.”).  As critics note, the doctrine would impose a de facto bar on 
non-standard terms if it were inattentive to firms’ efforts to put consumers on notice.  
See White, supra note 269, at 355. 
 272. 13 LORD, supra note 251, at § 38:1. 
 273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 illus. 2 (1981). 
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to the former owner.274  Given this risk of forfeiture, the law is reluctant to 
recognize terms as conditions.275  In the absence of a clear mutual under-
standing that a term is a condition, a court will construe it as a standard con-
tractual covenant enforceable by standard compensatory damages.276 
Conditions often exist at the intersection of contract and property law.277  
Consider again a hypothetical no-smoking term attached to the sale of a 
house.  If the court upholds the term as a condition, then the seller regains 
title and thereby wins a property remedy.  If the court enforces the term as a 
covenant, then the seller wins contractual damages but has no right to retake 
the property.  Contemporary licenses present a similar dichotomy: a term 
construed as a condition may give rise to copyright remedies, but the same 
term construed as a covenant gives rise only to contract remedies. 
1.  Term Standardization 
Despite their concerns regarding forfeiture, courts typically uphold con-
ditions where the parties express their intent clearly.278  One focus for judicial 
inquiry is the text of the agreement, where the anti-forfeiture norm manifests 
itself as a clear statement rule: courts are more likely to find a condition 
where parties use standardized language, e.g., stating that a set of rights is 
conveyed only “on the condition that” the other party refrains from some 
course of conduct.279 
 
 274. See Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, State Action, and the Legacy of Mas-
sive Resistance, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 769, 770-71 (1993) (considering such a 
condition). 
 275. Kraus & Scott, supra note 15, at 1083. 
 276. See, e.g., 13 LORD, supra note 251, at § 38:13 (“Contract conditions are 
generally disfavored . . . and conditions therefore will not be found unless there is 
unambiguous language indicating that the parties intended to create a conditional 
obligation.”). 
 277. The anti-forfeiture norm and the presumption in favor of treating a term as a 
covenant rather than a condition runs through both bodies of law.  See, e.g., Bornholdt 
v. S. Pac. Co., 327 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he rule of law is well settled, both 
in the interpretation of ordinary contracts and instruments transferring property, that 
the construction which avoids forfeiture must be made if it is at all possible.”); 13 
LORD, supra note 251, at § 38:4.  Given the potential for conditions to interfere with 
free alienation and other desiderata of property law, the presumption in favor of con-
tractual enforcement may be even stronger where property is implicated.  See gener-
ally Van Houweling, supra note 16 (explaining the many reasons for skepticism re-
garding servitudes in real property). 
 278. See generally 13 LORD, supra note 251, at § 38:13. 
 279. Id. at § 38:16 (suggesting the provisos “provided” or “on the condition 
that”); see also id. (“While there is no requirement that these or similar phrases be 
used, their absence suggests that the parties intended a promise, rather than a condi-
tion, and the terms will typically be construed in a manner consistent with that in-
tent.”); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 126 (identifying these key words in open 
licenses).  Other textualist canons also guide this inquiry.  Courts frown, for example, 
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Requirements like these tend to reduce the information costs associated 
with identifying conditions.280  Consistent with the demands of foreseeability, 
these requirements induce the drafting party to be forthcoming with the term 
or else see it go unenforced.  Because these requirements are primarily aimed 
at the terms’ presentation in the written agreement, however, their efficacy is 
limited to high-value transactions where parties find it worthwhile to read the 
agreement in detail.281 
The benefits of standardization, moreover, accrue primarily to those 
who know the standards.  Routinized language makes it easy for a court or an 
attorney to identify conditions with a high degree of accuracy.282  As noted 
above, however, Arthur Corbin remarked nearly a century ago that the word 
“condition” is “sometimes used in a very loose sense.”283  The layperson – 
even one who invested time to read a consumer contract – might therefore fail 
to appreciate the distinction between terms designated as conditions versus 
those called promises.284  Textual formalities like these might be necessary to 
create a condition, but it would be hasty to call them sufficient. 
2.  Materiality 
Contract law sometimes refuses to uphold conditions even where the 
clarity requirement is met.  In particular, courts may disregard a condition so 
as to avoid “disproportionate forfeiture” so long as the condition at issue is 
 
on intermingling purported conditions with other terms that are not conditions, see 
Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, 661 F.2d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no 
condition when the relevant terms mixed obligations on the part of the licensor with 
those of the licensee), and courts place great weight on the parties’ express acknowl-
edgement of the prior owner’s “right to reenter” in deciding whether to enforce a 
condition in real property, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 45 cmt. j (1936). 
 280. Phrased differently, these requirements reduce the risk that the parties will 
fail to identify the conditions of an agreement.  Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An 
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2061 (2012) (dubbing this 
possibility the risk of “party error”). 
 281. See supra Subsection I.B.1 (describing the opportunity costs of reading). 
 282. In communicating the import of the terms to third parties, these rules reduce 
the risk of “judicial error.”  Ayres, supra note 279, at 2061. 
 283. Corbin, supra note 23, at 743. 
 284. Accord Kenneally, supra note 7, at 1226 (“[L]icensees do not always under-
stand the legal ramifications of the conditions/covenants distinction and the tiny var-
iations in language that make the difference.”).  Even the parties drafting the license 
might not understand these distinctions.  As open source license drafter Lawrence 
Rosen notes, “Many of us license authors didn’t know the legal difference between a 
‘covenant’ and a ‘condition’ when our licenses were written (and many attorneys still 
don’t).”  Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and Open 
Source, 1 INT’L FREE & OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE L. REV. 27, 30 (2009). 
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not “a material part of the agreed exchange.”285  Materiality is of course slip-
pery.  Investigating materiality requires asking whether a particular term “was 
a sine qua non of the contract’s fulfillment.”286  This question makes sense 
enough for a contract where no conditions are expressly stated: the court can 
examine the totality of circumstances with special attention to such factors as 
whether the injured party is deprived of benefits it reasonably expected, or 
whether the injured party can be made whole through an award of damag-
es.287  Where express conditions are involved, however, this question requires 
second-guessing the parties: express conditions represent the parties’ own 
attempt to define which sorts of breach are material.288 
Courts often defend this brand of paternalism on substantive grounds.  
Where a party is late in making a payment or tendering notice, for example, 
courts often refuse to find material breach because they see no cognizable 
harm to the other party.289  Critics object that courts’ insertion of their own 
notions of substantive fairness introduces uncertainty into litigation by mak-
ing performance more difficulty to verify and damages more difficult to 
quantify.290 
The materiality inquiry could find stronger justification on grounds of 
procedural fairness.  Though judicial opinions seldom articulate the issue this 
way, a court might worry that parties do not read purported conditions that 
 
 285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981).  Courts likewise re-
tain discretion to excuse a condition that is contrary to public policy so long as it is 
not “essential” to “the agreed exchange.”  Id. at § 185. 
 286. Sahadi v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 706 F.2d 193, 198 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
 287. Accord id. at 196-97; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241. 
 288. Cf. Sahadi, 706 F.2d at 198 (explaining that “asking whether a provision is a 
‘condition’ is similar to stating the ‘materiality’ question”). 
 289. See, e.g., id. at 193 (excusing an interest payment that was one day late 
where upholding the condition would have allowed the bank to call a $7 million 
loan); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 1977) (“Allowing an 
insurance company, which has collected full premiums for coverage, to refuse com-
pensation to an accident victim or insured on the ground of late notice, where it is not 
shown timely notice would have put the company in a more favorable position, is 
unduly severe and inequitable.”). 
  The least controversial application of this principle is to late payment.  
Where a party pays late – excepting situations where delinquency might cause a li-
quidity crisis – the other party’s damages can be perfectly measured by late payment 
with interest.  To treat late payment as grounds for terminating the contract therefore 
invites forfeiture.  See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *159 (articulating 
this insight by way of mortgagors’ equity of redemption, i.e., their right to make late 
payment to cure a default).  The MDY court’s willingness to treat payment terms as 
conditions, see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.4 (9th 
Cir. 2010), therefore seems suspect on this dimension of materiality. 
 290. See, e.g., Kraus & Scott, supra note 15, at 1096; cf. Schwartz, supra note 
249, at 406 (defending liquidated damages as a mechanism to reduce litigation costs). 
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are buried in the fine print.291  They might also question whether a party who 
actually read could appreciate the difference between a term designated as a 
“condition” and the typical contractual promise.292  A strong default rule that 
treats contract terms as covenants – much like the default rule in favor of 
limiting compensatory damages to those that are reasonably foreseeable – 
lends accuracy to parties’ predictions regarding the scope of their obligations 
and the consequences of breach.  Parties ought to be able to contract around 
this default, but only by providing proper notice. 
* * * 
Copyright-enforceable license terms implicate the core remedial con-
cerns of contract.  When any term in the license for a digital work can be 
made enforceable in copyright, licensors can impose de facto liquidated dam-
ages of $750 or more on even the most trivial breach.293  For their part, licen-
sees are in no position to anticipate the risk.294  Contract law allows courts to 
account for these concerns by tending to consumers’ reasonable expectations 
in the licensing context.  Consider again the law’s reluctance to recognize 
conditions in real property: when a deed restriction serves as a condition, it 
creates a substantial risk of forfeiture because it could cost someone her 
home.295  Enforcement of copyright’s statutory damages imposes a risk of the 
same magnitude: copyright’s damages cap of $150,000 exceeds the median 
value of a home in many parts of the country.296  Yet real property has inher-
ent value that justifies resource-intensive inquiry into potential ownership 
restrictions at the time of sale.297  Consumer copyright licenses accompany 
low-value transactions that cannot justify the same expenditures.298  These 
licenses should accordingly be governed by a regime that requires licensors to 
provide unequivocal notice of any nonstandard terms they intend to enforce 
 
 291. Cf. Kraus & Scott, supra note 15, at 1096 (criticizing the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts for articulating the problem primarily in substantive terms rather 
than focusing on the procedural problem). 
 292. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
 294. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
627, 637-40 (2002) (tracing the need to disclose “radically unexpected terms” in ad-
hesive licenses to the foreseeability principle of Hadley); see also supra Section I.B. 
 295. See supra note 277; cf. Kraus & Scott, supra note 15, at 1084 (“[T]he law of 
conditions explicitly stacks the deck heavily against the finding and enforcement of 
conditions on the ground that the law abhors a forfeiture.”). 
 296. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
613 (2012), available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/
12s0978.pdf.  Indeed, when Congress increased the damages cap to $150,000 in 1999, 
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.  L. 
No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774, the median value of a home throughout the 
United States was only $141,200.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra. 
 297. See Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 16, at 20. 
 298. See id. 
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in copyright.  The next Part explores how this regime might look and how it 
could advance not only the goals of contract, but also those of copyright. 
V.  HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FOR COPYRIGHT CONDITIONS 
Consider how the court in MDY v. Blizzard could have guarded the pub-
lic interest – without having to contort copyright law – by focusing on the 
adequacy of notice.  Under the notice-based approach, the court would ask 
whether users had reason to expect copyright liability for cheating by having 
a bot play on their behalf.  It could be reasonably assured they did not.  Bliz-
zard would accordingly be foreclosed from suing for copyright’s statutory 
damages: its failure to carry the informational burdens that arose from its 
idiosyncratic terms would preclude the establishment of a valid condition.299  
The following discussion explains this intervention in greater detail and ar-
gues that, beyond policing against overreaching terms, this approach leaves 
room for the development of beneficial licensing arrangements and has the 
potential to enhance public deliberation on copyright policy. 
A.  Terms at Issue 
The terms where heightened notice is required are those that are simul-
taneously supracompensatory and unexpected.  Many high-stakes transac-
tions between commercial players would not implicate either concern.  The 
publishing house that owed Anne $200,000 in unpaid royalties, for example, 
would face actual damages greater than copyright’s maximum statutory dam-
ages of $150,000; suing for copyright’s statutory damages would be beside 
the point.  High-stakes licenses likewise run less risk of tacitly contradicting 
the parties’ expectations.  For bespoke agreements, the costs of identifying 
the operative terms are subsumed in the parties’ negotiations.  Even as to 
form agreements, a commercially significant transaction might justify careful 
study or even legal counsel. 
Consumer licenses tend to be more problematic, at least where idiosyn-
cratic terms are involved.  Practically any copyright enforceable term in this 
context poses a risk of substantive overreach: even copyright’s $200 mini-
mum statutory damages for innocent infringement will typically dwarf any 
actual damages that arise from personal use of a work.300  The more dynamic 
question is whether the user could reasonably anticipate that a particular sort 
of breach would lead to infringement liability. 
 
 299. The case is complicated by the fact that Blizzard was actually suing a sophis-
ticated party – a third-party software developer who might have understood the copy-
right implications of the license – for its role in inducing infringement.  I examine this 
wrinkle below in Section V.D. 
 300. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (exploring how copyright’s 
statutory damages can lead to a troubling ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages). 
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Users’ expectations largely ride on the licensor’s characterization of the 
transaction.  Even without reading the fine print, users who pay for a retail 
copy ought to expect copyright liability for reproducing the work, distributing 
bootleg copies, or performing the work in public.  They might even know a 
set of common or standardized license terms.  At the very least, hobbyist pro-
grammers might be imputed to know the obligations of the GPL and we 
might expect remix artists to be familiar with Creative Commons licenses. 
Even the user who was intimately familiar with the RAM copy doctrine, 
however, might be excused for assuming that a retail transaction authorized 
the full suite of conventional private uses.  The Safari for Windows license 
was an extreme example where the fine print interfered with these expecta-
tions – inadvertently threatening users with liability for the intended use of 
running the software on a Windows PC.301  So called “sales” of e-books and 
MP3s raise similar concerns.  Where the transaction is dubbed a sale, or 
where it bears the normal trappings of a sale, users may reasonably expect 
they can make the same sort of unfettered private uses of the work as they 
could with a hardcopy book or any piece of software “owned” for purposes of 
Section 117.302  These expectations are frustrated when licensors deny licen-
sees the authority to transfer their copies, or where they begin to limit the 
circumstances under which the user can enjoy the work.303  This is not to say 
there is anything inherently problematic about idiosyncratic restrictions.  But 
licensors cannot legitimately profit from customers’ reasonable misunder-
standings while disclaiming these expectations in the fine print.304 
B.  Enhanced Notice 
Enforcement of license terms in copyright is problematic when the user 
lacks adequate notice of the risk.  Consumer licenses are not valuable enough 
to justify reading a lengthy agreement, let alone invoking the sort of expertise 
 
 301. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 302. See, e.g., Seringhaus, supra note 61, at 202-03 (arguing we should treat e-
book downloads from Amazon as sales because Amazon advertises them as sales); 
see also supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (cataloging judicial and scholarly 
support for the position that perpetual possession implies ownership for purposes of 
copyright regardless of the fine print). 
 303. So far as users’ expectations go, rentals would not fare so differently.  Con-
sumers understand they do not hold title to a rented copy, that their possession is 
temporary, and that they have limited authority to transfer the item.  These under-
standings do not translate, however, into notice of potential liability for terms that, 
say, forbid fast-forwarding a digital film. 
 304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981) (making a contract 
voidable where one party was mistaken about the material requirements of the agree-
ment and “the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the 
mistake”); see also Rub, supra note 185, at 52-54 (arguing that copyright owners 
should not be able to contract around the first sale doctrine and other exhaustion prin-
ciples simply by including “magic words” in their licenses). 
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necessary to parse the technicalities that distinguish conditions from mere 
contractual promises.  Indeed, assigning the full burden of comprehension to 
the user heightens licensors’ incentives to draft licenses that are long, com-
plex, and self-serving.305  Rather than expect licensees to study their licenses 
for hidden traps, the better approach would require licensors to internalize the 
information costs of their idiosyncratic terms by providing clear and salient 
notice of any terms they intended to enforce in copyright. 
1.  Clarity 
At the very least, a licensor ought to be required to draft license condi-
tions so that the user who actually read the term could understand the conse-
quences of breach.  Many licenses would fail this simple test because they are 
written not for users, but for lawyers.  Designating the term as a “condition” 
or using other conventional magic words is helpful shorthand for those who 
know the jargon.  Standardization of this sort may work especially well for 
transactions that merit legal representation, like the sale of real property.  It is 
doubtful it works so well in the decidedly pro se context of reading consumer 
licenses.306  Consider an actual license term.  The license for Apple’s OS X 
operating system states that “Your rights under this License will terminate 
automatically . . . without notice from Apple if you fail to comply with any 
term(s) of this License.”307  Assuming that users read this term, how many 
would understand that it purported to authorize Apple to sue in copyright for 
continued use of the computer following even the most trivial breach? 
Clarity could be achieved through more careful drafting.  As to scope 
limitations, the licensor would need to explain that any uses of the work that 
failed to comply with the limitation would be considered infringement.  Not-
withstanding the sweeping language in Apple’s OS X license, Apple moves 
in the direction of clarity with an iTunes license that expressly states that 
license violation “may constitute copyright infringement.”308  As to termina-
tion conditions, the licensor would need to explain that failure to comply 
would result in termination of the license, and that continued use past the 
point of termination would be considered copyright infringement.  Licenses 
must be accessible to the lay reader if they are to have any claim to providing 
genuine notice. 
 
 305. See supra notes 66, 85-86 and accompanying text. 
 306. Recall that, historically, even the original drafters for some open source li-
censes have lacked a clear handle on the distinction between calling something a 
“condition” versus a “covenant.”  See supra note 284. 
 307. APPLE INC., supra note 82, at § 6. 
 308. Terms and Conditions, supra note 73, at § B. 
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2.  Salience 
Salience is the matter of whether a term enters the user’s understanding.  
No matter how clearly the term is drafted, it can only impact the user’s initial 
agreement or subsequent compliance if she is aware of it.  Simply mandating 
the disclosure of all terms is insufficient to ensure salience: licensors can 
discharge this duty by listing terms in the fine print without consumers notic-
ing.309  An effective regime must find some way to ensure that users actually 
understand the disclosures.  Many proposals have been floated for the proce-
dural reform of consumer contracting – from requiring licensees to slowly 
scroll through each term,310 to requiring licensees to separately initial each 
material term,311 to testing licensees to ensure comprehension.312  But a recent 
proposal by Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz is particularly promising due to its 
careful attention to users’ attention constraints and firms’ marketing incen-
tives.313 
Key to the Ayres and Schwartz approach is its method for identifying 
which terms require enhanced disclosure.  Adopting an approach that forced 
users to specifically read or assent to each and every term would impose 
enormous opportunity costs.314  It is also inefficient because it disregards 
consumers’ other sources of knowledge.  Consumers learn many product 
features from extracontractual sources such as advertisements and prior deal-
ings.315  For their part, sellers are motivated to emphasize the good features of 
their deals and dispel any erroneous perceptions of the costs and defects.316  
Combining these insights, Ayres and Schwartz would implement a “warning 
box” requiring special disclosure of (only) those terms that are unknown to 
the consumer and more unfavorable than expected.317  Idiosyncratic terms 
enforceable on pain of copyright’s statutory damages fit that description. 
It bears noting that Ayres and Schwartz contemplate an FTC mandate 
requiring all mass-market sellers to conduct studies to identify unexpected, 
unfavorable terms and then provide appropriate warning boxes.318  Such an 
 
 309. See supra note 88 (arguing that disclosing too much can be counterproduc-
tive).  See generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 64 (exploring the short-
comings of mandated disclosure). 
 310. See Gibson, supra note 66, at 226-28 (advocating “forced salience”). 
 311. See Ayres, supra note 280, at 2069 (questioning the effectiveness of these 
“mental speed bumps”). 
 312. See id. at 2076-80 (describing the “train-and-test” approach). 
 313. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 552. 
 314. Recall the millions of hours that would be lost if every Internet user actually 
read the license for Adobe Flash Player.  See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying 
text. 
 315. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 555. 
 316. Id. at 554 (arguing “[f]irms have an incentive to cure pessimism because it 
costs them sales”). 
 317. Id. at 553. 
 318. Id. at 580-81. 
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intervention might be salutary, but nothing so drastic is needed to reform 
copyright licensing.  The key intervention would come from courts holding 
licensors accountable for making unexpected terms salient as a matter of con-
tract law.  Licensors could attempt to meet this burden however they wanted, 
but it would be their job to convince the court that they succeeded.  The 
Ayres and Schwartz warning box might appeal to copyright owners due to its 
track record: preliminary research suggest it is effective in communicating a 
reasonable number of terms.319 
User-friendly license summaries like these also find precedent in the 
Creative Commons licenses.320  All the licenses feature a summary page that 
describes each operative condition in about a sentence, conveying these terms 
to the lay user without requiring her to read the full license.321  These licenses 
also keep the terms to a manageable number.  Each license is a permutation 
of just four possible terms – the licenses allow free copying and redistribution 
subject to (1) an attribution requirement (“BY”); (2) a prohibition on com-
mercial use (“NC” for “non-commercial”); (3) a prohibition on the creation of 
derivative works (“ND” for “no-derivatives”); or (4) a requirement that any 
derivative works be released under the same license terms (“SA” for “share-
alike”).322  And because the no-derivatives and share-alike provisions are 
mutually exclusive, no license features more than three of the terms at once.  
 
 319. See generally Joshua Mitts, How Much Mandatory Disclosure Is Effective? 
47, (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 2,404,526, Oct. 4, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2404526 (testing the Ayres and 
Schwartz warning box). 
 320. Several other distinguishing features might set the Creative Commons li-
censes apart from the typical consumer license.  For starters, they deal with uses like 
reproduction, distribution, and the creation of derivative works that the public under-
stands to be regulated by copyright; they do not target personal RAM copying.  
Somewhat counterintuitively, their novelty also reduces their informational burden.  
Because public licenses like these function differently than a traditional sale or rental, 
there is less chance that a user will mistakenly call up the wrong schema for under-
standing the transaction.  The standardization, relative simplicity, and widespread use 
of these licenses also lend themselves to the possibility that users have actually 
learned their terms.  Each of these features offers guidance to licensors who seek to 
make themselves better understood, but the discussion here focuses specifically on 
Creative Commons’ presentation of terms. 
 321. See, e.g., Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); see also About 
the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2015) (stating the material terms of each license in four sentences or fewer). 
 322. See About the Licenses, supra note 321.  This standardization has also facili-
tated automated indexing and searching of licensed works so that potential licensees 
can shop for the terms that fit their intended use.  See, e.g., CC Search, CREATIVE 
COMMONS, http://search.creativecommons.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (showing 
that search engines and databases including Google Images and the Wikipedia Com-
mons allow users to filter search results on the basis of Creative Commons license 
permissions). 
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Other licensors could emulate Creative Commons’ user-friendly disclosures.  
Alternatively, industry associations and regulators could follow the Creative 
Commons model in generating a menu of model terms or disclosure formats, 
vetting terms for problems and also capitalizing on the advantages of volun-
tary standardization.323  Model forms like these could provide a baseline 
against which courts could measure consumers’ reasonable expectations.324 
C.  Termination and Prospective Relief 
Say that a licensor does not meet the heightened notice burden outlined 
above.  Is that licensor forever consigned to combat breach through contrac-
tual actions, no matter how ineffective?  Not necessarily.  In many cases the 
licensor will have laid the proper groundwork to terminate the license and 
obtain prospective relief. 
Copyright’s statutory damages have driven the foregoing analysis.  This 
Article submits that suits for copyright damages premised on license breach 
should often fail as a matter of contract law, not only because these damages 
are so far divorced from actual compensatory damages but also because users 
are unlikely to have knowingly accepted this risk.  Termination remedies, 
however, would often fare differently because they are both more predictable 
and less extreme. 
Some license types lend themselves especially well to termination.  
Where cloud software, streaming media, or similar subscription services are 
involved, the user ought to understand – even without reading the license in 
any detail – that the licensor has authority to police use of the work and there-
fore ought to expect that her account can be closed for breach of various 
terms in the account agreement.325  The licensor could accordingly invoke its 
contractual authority to terminate the licensee’s access without offending 
contract principles.  In other words, the user ought not be surprised – nor 
should she have a defense in contract – if Netflix disabled her account after 
she missed a monthly payment.  The user likewise ought not be surprised if 
Blizzard terminates her ability to play WoW for cheating. 
To be sure, the act of termination cannot be entirely divorced from an 
infringement suit: continued use of a work after termination gives rise to po-
 
 323. Cf. Gillette, supra note 226, at 983-84.  The difference between this approach 
and the mandatory standardization contemplated supra at Subsection III.B.2 of this 
Article is that adopting the voluntary standards would be just one way – not the only 
way – of establishing copyright enforceability. 
 324. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: 
Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 85 (2014) 
(arguing that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s model language for credit 
card contracts is valuable because it sets similar baselines in consumer finance). 
 325. Cf. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 551 (“[N]ew car buyers know that 
the warranty does not last forever . . . it is less clear that consumers would expect their 
mortgage to have a prepayment penalty term or a forum selection clause requiring 
them to sue in a distant jurisdiction.”). 
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tential copyright liability.  But courts can ensure that any such liability is 
preceded by adequate notice by requiring termination itself to be overt and 
giving the licensee a reasonable opportunity to discontinue use.326  Consider 
how these limits would protect against overreaching in a counterfactual world 
where Netflix was highly litigious and indifferent to its reputation.  This Net-
flix might allow delinquent subscribers to continue streaming films after they 
had missed a payment and then attempt to sue them for watching videos in 
violation of their licenses.  Besides being a disastrous business model, this 
approach is beyond the pale of what any subscriber expects.  Requiring Net-
flix to provide notice prior to the accrual of copyright liability would protect 
users from this sort of opportunism. 
Termination is also more palatable because, at least in consumer cases, 
it will often be less disproportionate to the breach than copyright’s statutory 
damages.  True, even the standard contractual condition raises concerns of 
forfeiture so far as the common law is concerned.327  Insofar as termination 
sounds in injunctive relief, there are also reasons grounded in copyright that 
courts ought to be conservative in enforcing these terms.328  But few would 
argue that losing access to a $0.99 MP3 track is as severe as paying $200, 
$750, or more in damages.  Termination, moreover, does not raise the same 
sort of perverse incentives as copyright’s statutory damages.  Copyright’s 
statutory damages are appealing to opportunists not only for their strong co-
ercive force, but also for their lucre.  By contrast, termination remedies that 
require turning customers away following minor breach do not maximize 
profits.  In many cases the terminated licensee could argue for restitution of 
 
 326. This approach finds grounding in judicial opinions allowing licensees a brief 
grace period to wind down the use of a work following termination of a license.  See 
Geoscan, Inc. of Tex. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 390, 393 (5th Cir. 
2000); Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750 (E.D. Mich. 1998).  Provid-
ing notice prior to the accrual of liability is of course also familiar to copyright law as 
the cornerstone of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor, which shields 
Internet service providers from liability for their users’ content prior to the receipt of 
takedown notices.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012); see also Tonya M. Evans, “Safe 
Harbor” for the Innocent Infringer in the Digital Age, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 25 
(2013) (proposing the extension of similar safe harbors to users). 
 327. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
 328. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms 
of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1045-
46 (1990) (considering how private injunctive power raises the specter of censorship); 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectu-
al Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (explaining how copyright injunctions 
act as prior restraints on speech).  To the extent that firms sought to obtain injunctive 
relief for violation of conditions, however, courts could guard the public interest in 
exercising their statutory discretion over whether to award injunctive relief.  See su-
pra notes 235-36 and accompanying text; see also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 
134-35 (identifying specific factors courts ought to consider in the licensing context). 
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the original purchase price, further dampening the licensor’s enthusiasm.329  
The licensor might offer a new license following termination – this time mak-
ing the conditions more salient – but the licensee would be under no obliga-
tion to accept. 
D.  Secondary Liability 
Secondary liability presents a special puzzle.  Ordinarily, secondary in-
fringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement.330  This 
means that a party like MDY could not be liable for vicarious infringement 
unless Glider users themselves infringed Blizzard’s copyright.  Under the 
analysis proposed above, this would mean that MDY’s liability would hinge 
on whether the Glider users received sufficient notice.  One could imagine an 
alternative system where courts inquired instead into whether MDY was 
aware that Glider ran afoul of a purported condition in Blizzard’s license.  
After all, MDY was a sophisticated party with significant economic interests 
in the relationship between WoW and its subscribers.  Such parties have few-
er excuses to be ignorant. 
This more liberal approach to secondary liability would present difficult 
policy questions.331  Insofar as the courts were concerned with protecting 
consumers against liability for unwitting infringement, this separate treatment 
of users and third-party developers might be sufficient to guard the public’s 
interest.  But this approach would do nothing to motivate firms to actually 
disclose their purported conditions to the broader public.  It would therefore 
miss the opportunity to make unexpectedly restrictive terms transparent so 
that the public could guard against overreaching.332  Checks like these are 
 
 329. The typical remedy for material breach of a copyright agreement is rescis-
sion, which seeks to “return the parties to their positions prior to contracting.”  See 3 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 10.15[A][3].  This remedy often requires the 
rescinding party to provide restitution – that is, to return whatever consideration it has 
received minus appropriate offsets for its erstwhile use of the work.  See id.  A full 
account of the availability and desirability of such repayment is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it would seem that allowing liberal access to restitution would deter 
use of the termination remedy for breach of trivial conditions.  Cf. Richard R.W. 
Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 YALE L.J. 690 
(2011) (arguing that the availability of rescission and restitution remedies may en-
courage efficient investment in the performance of contractual duties). 
 330. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 12.04[D][1] (“[T]he rule 
should generally prevail that third-party liability, as its name implies, may exist only 
when direct liability, i.e., infringement, is present.” (internal citations omitted)); MDY 
Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To establish 
secondary infringement, Blizzard must first demonstrate direct infringement.”). 
 331. Recall that the court is empowered to take account of policy considerations 
in determining whether to treat a term as a condition.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 185 (1981). 
 332. This transparency might not be so critical under a regime of substantive regu-
lation where courts, legislators, or other policymakers policed against overreaching 
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especially important in light of the potentially anti-competitive motives that 
animate firms like Blizzard to target third developers like MDY who wish to 
offer add-on products.  Retaining the traditional rule – requiring direct liabil-
ity as a precondition to secondary liability – seems to better promote trans-
parency and public participation.333 
E.  Progress Through Process 
Determined licensors could discharge the obligations of heightened no-
tice easily enough.  Through smarter disclosure – or sustained public educa-
tion campaigns – they could put the public on notice of any number of idio-
syncratic conditions.  As the terms piled up, the public might simply accept 
heavily restricted use as the new normal.334  The skeptic might therefore 
question what good heightened notice requirements would do in the long 
term. 
The significance of these notice requirements is that they force licensors 
to proceed in the open.  This move has immediate practical consequences: it 
removes the risk of unwitting infringement via license breach.  Greater trans-
parency also paves the way for public watchdogs to become more involved.  
With easier access to information, consumer advocacy groups could advise 
the public of the risks associated with a given firm’s licenses much like Con-
sumer Reports evaluates car safety.  They could also become a site for collec-
tive action, rallying public opinion to persuade firms to abandon overreaching 
terms – or Congress to intervene – even in cases where individuals might not 
find it worthwhile to protest acting alone.  Such action is possible even with-
out heightened disclosures.335  The Electronic Frontier Foundation, for exam-
 
without the need for public involvement.  But insofar as this Article seeks to carve out 
space for the public to judge licenses in the market and in the political process, trans-
parency is key.  See infra Section V.E. 
 333. This approach would not leave Blizzard without recourse.  A no-bots provi-
sion that failed as a license condition would likely be enforceable as a contractual 
promise.  See generally supra Section IV.C.  To the extent MDY intentionally in-
duced players to breach their contracts, Blizzard would have the foundation for its 
claim of tortious interference in contract.  See MDY, 629 F.3d at 955-58 (considering 
this argument and remanding it for trial).  Nothing about this approach, moreover, 
would require Blizzard to directly sue its customers.  So long as it provided users with 
proper notice of the conditions, it could still direct its litigation efforts exclusively 
towards MDY.  And in any case the notice requirements proposed in this Article 
would not interfere with the enforcement of terms – whether by direct or third-party 
action – that were neither supracompensatory nor unexpected to users.  See supra 
Section V.A. 
 334. Cf. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002) (describing the slow erosion of privacy protections 
under a “reasonable expectations” standard as people adjust their expectations down-
ward in light of new incursions). 
 335. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 64, at 186 (arguing that informed 
intermediaries “can . . . succeed without mandated disclosure”). 
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ple, intermittently reports on overreaching terms of service through its 
“Terms Of (Ab)Use” project.336  But trawling through licenses for overreach-
ing terms is costly, and the current system leaves room for firms to equivo-
cate if they are confronted.  Heightened disclosure would reduce the infor-
mation costs associated with successful consumer advocacy. 
This move is also significant in creating opportunities for greater public 
participation in the making of copyright policy.  As it stands, one of the most 
powerful critiques of copyright licenses is that they act as “private legisla-
tion” – that they allow firms to unilaterally create and secure new rights over 
works they own.337  And actual copyright legislation suffers from similar ills: 
many would argue that copyright has historically been dominated by compet-
ing industry interest groups, insulated from public scrutiny, and slow in re-
sponding to change.338  The subjection of license conditions to public scrutiny 
may shift the playing field by providing a more active role for the public, its 
advocates, and new generations of creators to voice their concerns regarding 
copyright enforcement.339  Consider the relative stakes and costs of involve-
ment.  While the stakes in copyright legislation are diffuse and de-
personalized, the stakes for the typical consumer license are significant and 
personal given the risk of copyright liability.  These are the sorts of stakes 
that could serve as a site of collective action if only consumers could cut 
through the complexity of these agreements.  A notice-based intervention 
could clear these information costs and help users identify their concrete in-
terests.  Rather than leave the matter entirely to legislators, industry insiders, 
or courts, this strategy would pave the way for the public to take a position – 
in the market by accepting or rejecting terms, or in politics by organizing – on 
the acceptability of novel allocations of rights.340 
 
 336. See generally Terms of (Ab)Use, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.
org/issues/terms-of-abuse (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 337. See Winston, supra note 104. 
 338. See Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legis-
lative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 212-20 (2013) (syn-
thesizing the scholarship that argues copyright’s expansion results from “the dispro-
portionate influence of corporate rights holders over copyright lawmaking in the past 
forty years”). 
 339. See Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Li-
censing: Moderating the Rein Over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183, 214 (2006) 
(arguing that under the right conditions “the license is an institutional mechanism 
enabling exit and voice”). 
 340. This approach is informed by other work that emphasizes the importance of 
public participation in the establishment and interpretation of law.  See, e.g., WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (2010) (arguing that important legal commitments emerge from 
deliberation among intersecting social movements, the private sector, and policymak-
ers); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1943, 1985 (2003) (defending the courts’ consideration of social movements and 
popular debate even in matters of constitutional interpretation). 
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Aside from expanding copyright decision-making to a larger polity, the 
notice-based approach is also valuable because it creates space for experi-
mentation with novel licensing forms.341  Worldwide intellectual property 
harmonization deprives us of natural comparisons between alternative copy-
right regimes.342  Private actors nonetheless experiment with alternative ar-
rangements by license and other means of private ordering.  These arrange-
ments provide data by which we might begin to assess the costs and benefits 
of different allocations of rights, laying the groundwork for possible substan-
tive interventions in Congress or the courts.  And this data would be even 
more valuable if it reliably indicated users’ assent to novel allocations of 
rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article deploys contract law to limit private parties’ power to re-
write the Copyright Act.  The Article nonetheless examines only one piece of 
a larger puzzle.  Even if courts adopted this proposal, firms could enforce 
idiosyncratic restrictions many other ways, most notably by enforcing license 
terms in contract343 or imposing technological protection measures.344  Condi-
tions nonetheless demand special attention because they are unique in permit-
ting copyright owners to call down the full force of copyright’s statutory 
damages scheme to penalize activities that do not directly implicate the ex-
clusive rights set forth at Section 106.345 
 
 341. For a classic statement of courts’ role in advancing policy experimentation, 
see Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 673-74 (1981) (arguing that the existence 
of multiple fora advances the articulation of new norms and the instantiation of new 
policies while limiting fallout from risky experiments). 
 342. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 
(2015) (addressing this problem in the patent law context). 
 343. See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 122 (arguing that mere contractual enforcement 
of licensors’ self-serving terms is problematic). 
 344. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095 
(2003) (arguing for a misuse doctrine to regulate overreaching technological protec-
tion measures); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have 
To Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2007) (describing the problems that accrue to consumers for 
lack of disclosure regarding digital rights management technologies); Peter K. Yu, 
Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13 (2006) (ex-
ploring the problems of technological protection measures for the international copy-
right regime). 
 345. Recall that for purposes of copyright even an innocent infringer is liable for 
at least $200 in damages.  See supra Section II.A.  An action for circumvention of a 
technological protection measure, by contrast, permits maximum statutory damages 
of only $2500 and vests courts with discretion to award no damages in cases of inno-
cent violation.  17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(2), (c)(5)(A) (2012).  Claims for breach of con-
tract are likewise limited to actual damages.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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As the foregoing discussion has shown, the urgency of the distinction 
between enforcing a term in copyright or in contract is a function of the judi-
ciary’s lack of discretion in assigning copyright remedies.  Some commenta-
tors seem to think it is a waste of effort to invest so much energy into drawing 
the line between conditions and mere promises.346  Perhaps it is.  But copy-
right permits extremely little flexibility at the remedial stage once a condition 
is found.  Under copyright law as it exists today, even the most trivial breach 
by the most unwitting infringer requires an award of at least $200 in damag-
es.347  Any court that wishes to act on the equities of the case therefore must 
do so during the interpretive step of deciding whether the term constitutes a 
valid condition. 
Careful attention to the problem of distinguishing conditions from cove-
nants also offers new perspectives on the institutional dynamics of copyright 
policymaking and enforcement.  Courts are competent to consider whether 
licensors have made adequate disclosures to designate an idiosyncratic term 
as a condition.  Courts are not well suited, however, to answer the kinds of 
policy questions that arise from attempts to impose a “nexus” or similar sub-
stantive limits on the enforcement of license terms.  By requiring heightened 
notice as a prerequisite to the enforcement of conditions, however, the judici-
ary can play a valuable role in copyright policymaking by exposing license 
terms to greater scrutiny by other institutional actors and the broader public. 
 
CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (explaining contract’s compensatory damages scheme); see 
also supra Section IV.A. 
 346. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 7, at 132 (questioning the “emphasis on 
identifying the absolute definitional boundary between contractual covenants and 
license conditions”). 
 347. See supra Section II.A. 
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